It's been a while since I flew the police EC135 but I recall some aspects of it like it was yesterday:
Every trip I did I leftthe Tx pumps ON throughout the trip. If the captions illuminated during a high nose up as the pumps cavitated - I ignored them because I knew they would go out as they became fully immersed in fuel seconds later.[Otherwise I would be forever switching between ON and OFF during the hover].
Day time - I would invariably and knowingly fly to main tank dry. I would watch the fuel levels in both supply tanks knowing that there is where my MLA was (60kg). I 'think' there is a 3 or 4 lb delta between both supply tanks. I would ALWAYS plan to land on back at base with sufficient fuel to remain above the MLA - just good captaincy. NOT ONCE have I ever gone below MLA - no job is worth it.
Night time - requires a little more caution and more attentio to the fuel flow - leaving sufficent in the main tank and FULL supply tanks to land on @ night MLA. Invariably I would leave quite a lot more than MLA @ night for the wife and kids especially operating where i did in the middle of the boon docks where a forced landing due to low fuel would possibly end up in a world of hurt do to the nature of the ad hoc LZ.
The AAIB tells it as it 'was'. The Tx pumps were off and the Prime pumps were ON.
From now on, this is my perspective on what happened:
He'd left the prime pumps on throughout the sortie.
At some stage in flight, he'd been in the hover and the Tx pumps were flagging up cavitation due to hover attitude. He'd switched them OFF - been distracted after flying out of the hover and failed to turn them back on again.
He was @ 400' [why do people think he was @ 1000'?]. when the first engine failed due to fuel starvation. He was sorting out the lost services due to the engine failure (mainly police equipment) AND he was positioning for a landing @ night low level over a city, 180 degrees out of wind when the second donk stopped UNEXPECTEDLY(in his mind). He continued to manoeuvre for a landing spot whilst milking the Nr and unfortunately allowed it to drop below its recoverable minimum (83% I recall???). Hyds fail at 63% - where there is total loss of aircraft control.
I can't help but think about another issue that is bugging me:
Amongst other a/c types, I come across Chinook pilots in my teachings. My impression from dealing with these guys who fly an a/c where power is on permanent and almost unlimited supply (plus enormous rotor inertia) - EOL's (BOTH engines switched off) is alien to them. I don't mean that from an unprofessional perspective - they simply don't train for it, nor contemplate it as much as others who regard total engine failure as a real possibility. Food for thought perhaps?
My only remaining unanswered question I have in this very sad situation is this:
Why were the RED warning alerts on the CWP not spotted or commented on by ANY of the crew?