Quoting Rat 5:
Guys, we're still arguing in circles around the crux of the matter. Why did Land 2 necessitate a G/A? The G/A procedure was messed up, but why was it performed in the first place? Perhaps someone inside AF can enlighten us as to their SOP's. If the G/A was not necessary then that decision is the root cause of the subsequent problems. Why, how it was messed up; autopilot disconnect forces, the position of switches, etc.etc. are all consequent of the initial action and worthy of discussion under another topic.
In direct discussion of this incident I'm curious if the G/A decision was appropriate yes/no.
The report states the following:
2.3 Operator instructions for CAT 3 final approach
According to the currently applicable operational documentation (GENOPS,
TU777, QRH), “Regardless of the meteorological conditions, an automatic approach
and landing are always possible. However, in both cases the following conditions
must be met:
ˆˆ The aircraft equipment must have LAND2 or LAND3 status;
ˆˆ The QFU used must have an ILS CAT2/CAT3;
ˆˆ The automatic landing limitations must be respected;
ˆˆ The task-sharing must be that of CAT2/3 approaches.”
…
“The following events result in a single “WARNING” callout making a go-around
mandatory:
ˆˆ Any audio warning;
ˆˆ Any Master Warning or Master Caution (display lights on);
ˆˆ Any degradation in capabilities;
ˆˆ Any non-compliant flight mode annunciator (FMA) display or excessive deviation
below 500 feet.”
….
“The go-around is performed by the captain, the co-pilot monitors the flight path, performs the standard callouts and the announcement to ATC.”
The following elements are based on recorded data (QAR, FDR) and accounts from the flight crew. The CVR, which was safeguarded by the crew, was erased by mistake before it could be read out by the BEA.
How convenient! Since when do crew remove or handle the CVR or FDR from the scene of a crash??? I thought that was the job of whichever authority was investigating the case/incident/crash.
The information in the report from the pilots testimony leads me to understand that the captain could see the runway, and he wanted to continue the approach visually. The first officer had decided to follow the above SOP to the letter and go around.
What isn’t in their testimony is:
1: The captain never said he had control.
2. He never called that he had the runway in sight.
3. He never called “Continue” at minimum.
In my evaluation based on the official report, a contributing factor would be lack of communication in the cockpit. No CRM.