But now we have a quantum leap forward in gross dereliction of duty and making of false certification. Nimrod tried to update their old Safety Case; the seat IPT apparently didn't even bother asking if one existed in the first place, yet presumably certified it had one and that it was valid (otherwise the seat couldn't be presented to the aircraft IPTs for use).
Also, the Aircraft Design Authority (or whoever is tasked to prepare and maintain the Whole Aircraft Safety Case) is REQUIRED to verify the seat Safety Case exists and is valid, and subsume it within his Safety Case. How can the WASC be valid? How can the Hawk RTS be valid, or that of any other aircraft using this seat? This isn't some minor part of the aircraft, it is a Safety Critical System.
These are massive issues so worth repeating. To be clear, since the dawn of the MAA regulations the ODH is the named individual responsible for the Air System Safety Case - it is a 'shall' order and he is the owner and the manager of it. No escape (RA1205).
My burning question is how can it come to pass that a Safety Case is missing and yet the ODHs have declared the risks Tolerable and ALARP? On what basis can the ODH(s) make and sign their 6-monthly declarations if they have not scrutinised the non-existent SC?
I have seen no action taken against the ODH's for the 6-monthly rubber-stamping of Safety Cases that actually do not actually exist. It remains an act of Parliament that inaccurate certification is an imprisonable offence (sec 36).
http://www.maa.mod.uk/linkedfiles/re...ies/ra1205.pdf
Armed Forces Act 2006