CM
I have often asked the question whose job it is to reconcile differences between these reports and demonstrable fact. Also, who takes the next step when the SI/BoI stops abruptly and fails to ask the next logical question, which would reveal the truth. The answer is, the MAA. But they abrogate their responsibility.
As DV has said above, the Red Arrows SI report states a Safety Case report could not be found for the seat. (So what authority is there to fit it? Where is the audit trail back from the RTS?) Not that it was simply lost or mislaid, but there was an assumption that someone else had done the work. A Safety Critical system, and they rely on an assumption. Criminal.
On Nimrod, at least the IPT leader (Baber) recognised he should have a Safety Case, and let a contract. The fact he was meant to have inherited a continuous contract and valid Safety Case was conveniently overlooked in the rush to blame him. That the contract was managed poorly was an entirely different issue. For his alleged sins, MoD and the CPS considered the prosecution of he and others. They jumped back when the truth was revealed - that a policy had been issued that Safety Cases and updates would NOT be funded.
But now we have a quantum leap forward in gross dereliction of duty and making of false certification. Nimrod tried to update their old Safety Case; the seat IPT apparently didn't even bother asking if one existed in the first place, yet presumably certified it had one and that it was valid (otherwise the seat couldn't be presented to the aircraft IPTs for use).
Also, the Aircraft Design Authority (or whoever is tasked to prepare and maintain the Whole Aircraft Safety Case) is REQUIRED to verify the seat Safety Case exists and is valid, and subsume it within his Safety Case. How can the WASC be valid? How can the Hawk RTS be valid, or that of any other aircraft using this seat? This isn't some minor part of the aircraft, it is a Safety Critical System.
I've spoken before about the simple 3 link chain: Maintained Build Standard > Safety Case > RTS. In this case, the Build Standard was not maintained and there isn't a Safety Case to be found, which is far worse than Nimrod or even Chinook Mk2. Even on the latter, we have evidence of the aircraft project director advising senior staffs that the safety case was being compromised. On the seat, it seems no such warning could ever be forthcoming.
Common denominator? Who chopped the safety funding to offset the gross and conscious waste his department was perpetrating? Same old names, yet again. And, yet again, this fact is missing from an SI report. MoD/MAA know the failures, and the solution, but what have they done?
So, given this is in every way worse than Nimrod and Chinook, except in the number of deaths, can we expect a Haddon-Cave v2? And this time can we have someone who won't conceal the facts to protect certain retired VSOs?