The bits about unit culture may well offend some who know or are connected with former RAFAT members. But there is simply no way that observations on cultural issues can be made with unequivocal, physical evidence, so it is inevitable that there will be a certain amount of gap-filling and inference by the Panel as they join together disparate items such as F700 procedures, briefing timelines, training records, IR currency etc. A SI is not bound by criminal standards of admissibility of evidence and the President would have formed an overall impression of the unit, for which he then had to select the best 'recordable' examples to illustrate in the report. He came to his view as an independent professional and evidently persuaded the Convening Authority that he had enough on which to base the comments. What interest could the President have in dragging the Reds through the mud for the sake of it? He was RN, so unlikely to be bitter in the way a failed selectee might have been, and there's no chance that the (light blue) DG MAA would have allowed his SI to be used as a platform for gratuitous inter-service sniping. In case my position is unclear, I think that the accident was made more likely by the pace at which routine business was being carried out. That makes unit culture a contributory factor, plain and simple.
I think I saw the phrase "tall poppy syndrome" used earlier, and frankly that sums it up. Too many display pilots have died and even killed others because their conduct and ability was considered beyond question by anyone outside the elite. Sometimes a "tall poppy" has to be cut down to size, and that's not bitterness, it's the sad lesson of at least 30 years of accidents. The very use of that phrase indicates that some consider the Reds to be above criticism. They're not.
Three points in closing:
One - I know that none of the current team were in place during the period which set the culture reported by the SI. That doesn't render the report irrelevant. 22 Gp would have been made aware of the Panel's concerns during the investigation, so it would be surprising if remedial action hadn't already been taken by the time of publication. The recorded findings are left to serve as another reminder to senior supervisors of things to watch for in future. No doubt they'll feature in discussion on flying supervisory courses.
Two - To those who protest at the team's portrayal. By virtue of your knowledge and connection to the (former) team, you have an emotional stake in their reputation. I trust the Panel's independent view more than I trust your protestations to the contrary, however well-informed or intentioned. For what it's worth, several individuals who I consider fit to hold a view are unsurprised by the findings.
Three - To Chug et al, do you really believe that today's VSOs would deliberately drag the good name of junior personnel in their premier
PR and recruiting tool through the mud for the sole purpose of diverting attention from a finding that calls into question the conduct of some long-retired VSOs who now have zero influence over their careers? Especially when DG MAA was himself retiring, and when CAS is the self-same officer whose findings in the Mull board were turned over by the malign cabal? If anything, I would expect CAS to be hunting desperately for a chance to hang these old men out to dry.