Thanks for the contributions of the ‘informed’ knowledge.
The technical inquiry is if there would be any other indication as to why the system degraded, e.g. rad alt fail; and if so would there be any other flight deck alert, independent of the autopilot.
As for ‘no land 3’, I presume that this is actually a change of status (system integrity / capability) for which there is no alert other than the change of annunciation. Thus an alert ‘warning’ call might be unwarranted; whereas the change of state – ‘LAND 2’ call could aid system awareness and cue remaining capability.
The lack of GA – mis selection, contributed to the incident, and appears to be associated with a weak design / switch location. Just because everyone else manages to select GA does not mean that the design is adequate for all situations, especially those with surprise.
The crew procedures should be considered in the context of the situation. If the crew choose to autoland in clear conditions – a practice approach without LVP, then an unwarranted change of state might be anticipated. A pre landing briefing should cover the alternative courses of action – land 2 or manual, etc.
Alternatively, as in this instance, the autoland was with LVP but > cat3 , thus a change of state might be less lightly, but still significant; the pre landing briefing again should specify the choice of action, e.g. if land 2 then continue, if AP disc then GA.
For visibilities requiring full Cat 3 capability then the alternatives would be further limited, but in all cases the annunciation call / change of state could be the same – consistency.
The GA flight procedure might vary - auto / manual, but the monitoring should be similar. The PNF should be able to select a change of configuration, quickly scan pitch, power, speed, then check back to the configuration.
In these instances it is not that the tactical situation management was weak, but more of the strategic plan. What was the pre landing briefing, what monitoring was expected - relative importance of modes vs aircraft flight path, what parameters should be scanned, why, when (cf BEA AGASA study).
Are crews prepared to be surprised?