Continuing with the theme of lessons from the past, comes this from my edition of Aviation Safety Digest No 1. Under the heading Airport Discipline, is this brief report:
An Auster taxied past the Control Tower at Bankstown within 20 feet of the signal square. The wind "T" was pointing NE, but the aircraft took off into the SW without the pilot giving any notice of his intentions. During the take-off, the aircraft crossed the landing path of several aircraft, causing some of them to go around again. Shortly after becoming airborne the Auster pilot made a climbing right hand turn from 100 feet on to course.
The pilot of the Auster displayed a serious lack of airport discipline resulting in other aircraft being placed in a hazardous position. The pilot has been severely reprimanded for his carelessness in failing to keep a proper look out.
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The editor of Aviation Safety Digest didn't pull punches as you can see by the his comments. He told it like it was. I can just imagine the Auster pilot being ordered to report to a DCA Examiner (probably a former RAAF wartime Wing Commander) and being roared at for being a flying hoon.
Now other pilots can learn lessons from reading the report rather than nowadays where ATSB are oh so careful of the legal ramifications if they are seen to openly criticise the actions of the pilot. So they include a list of "Significant Factors" instead, leaving readers to come to their own conclusions.
And here is another one which will interest those who used to fly from Moorabbin in the old days. The heading is "Take-Off Accident Moorabbin Airport 1953"
Immediately after becoming airborne from Moorabbin Airport, Victoria on 17th January 1953, the port engine of an Avro Anson failed. The aircraft continued across the aerodrome a few feet above the ground until it struck a telephone post on the road at the northern boundary of the aerodrome and crashed into field on the opposite side of the road. The crew of three were uninjured. The aircraft was extensively damaged by the collision and impact.
During the run-up before take-off, an engine revolution drop of approximately 150 revolutions on the starboard magneto of the starboard engine revealed during this run up, was cleared after the engine had been operated for some 15 to 20 minutes. The pilot then carried out a pre-take-off check at the take-off point. The take-off was quite normal and after travelling 1800 to 2000 feet the aircraft became airborne.
At this stage, the pilot felt a loss of power which he at first thought was in the starboard engine because of the previous r.p.m. drop. However, he immediately realised, from the tendency of the aircraft to swing to the left, that the power loss was on the port side and was moving to pull the port throttle off when the engine momentarily picked up again. The pilot thought it was only a momentary loss of power and decided to continue to take-off, but almost immediately the port engine failed completely. Realising that he would not be able to climb away, the pilot elected to fly under some telephone wires on the northern boundary and land in a paddock across the road rather than attempt to bring the aircraft to rest within the aerodrome boundary.
The aircraft gradually lost height and the main wheels struck a mound of earth near the aerodrome boundary. It then bounced across the road and struck a telephone post, severing some 14 feet of the port wing, and finally struck the ground on the other side of the road, coming to rest in a cultivated field.
Analysis: An examination of the engine failed to reveal any defect, abnormality or evidence of malfunctioning that may have contributed to or caused the engine failure.
The testimony of the pilot and crew revealed that there had been an unnecessary, unorthodox and complicated manipulation of the fuel cocks prior to take-off which suggested that the engine failure could have been due to the mismanagement of the fuel system. The nature of the engine failure was consistent with fuel starvation. Furthermore, the stage at which the engine failed, corresponds with the point an engine would fail if the fuel had been turned off at the pre-take-off position.
Interrogation of the pilot revealed that this was only his second flight as a pilot of an Avro Anson aircraft for some nine years and that he was not entirely familiar with the fuel system. There is no possibility that the take-off could have been continued after the loss of one engine as tests show that an Avro Anson, with the undercarriage down, will only just maintain height on one engine at an all-up weight of 7,400 ib., when operated under standard atmospheric conditions at sea level. The aircraft in this case was loaded to approximately 8,200 ib.
Cause: The cause of the accident was the failure of the port engine, just after the aircraft became airborne, which resulted in the aircraft being unable to climb away. The engine failure was caused by fuel starvation probably due to mismanagement of the fuel system by the pilot.
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Some eight years after that Anson accident I was posted to RAAF Headquarters Support Command in St Kilda Rd, Melbourne where I was appointed to the job of HQ Support Command Aero Club Liaison Officer. My duties included supervising the RAAF Air Training Corps Flying Scholarship Scheme. By sheer rat cunning I managed to sneak away from my desk and regularly fly with ATC cadets attached to the Royal Victorian Aero Club. The RAAF kindly allotted 50 hours a year for my continuation training at various aero clubs. This was in addition to regular flying I was able to cadge in the Vampires and Dakotas of The Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) at RAAF base Laverton. So for a desk job in HQ I didn't do too badly chasing flying.
One of the many civilian pilots I was privileged to meet at Moorabbin was Barry Allen who was about the same age (30) as me in those days. Barry flew an Avro Anson single pilot on passenger and freight runs to western Victoria, and invited me along for a ride. As I soon discovered, it certainly wasn't my highly intelligent absolutely delightful personality that prompted him to offer the flight to me. No, it was something else - and Barry could see a sucker a mile away.
We climbed up through the Anson (VH-FIC) rear door and crawled over freight to reach the cockpit. Barry took the left seat and I took the right seat. He pointed at a handle in the cockpit floor and said that when the time came to retract the undercarriage would I mind winding the handle about 40 revolutions to get the wheels into the underside of the engine nacelles. He warned me it was a hard work especially in the last few winds of the handle. He wasn't wrong. Flying an Anson single pilot and having to wind the undercarriage retraction handle with one hand while flying with the other hand would tax the strongest man. Hence Barry Allen's "kind" offer for me to come for the trip!
Having regained my breath after winding the undercarriage up, I was able to sit back and enjoy the country side all the way to Hamilton. Barry was an excellent pilot and did a lovely three pointer on the grass at Hamilton. Before that he let me tune the ancient radio compass which had a handle to select various frequencies. The radio compass was situated in the cockpit roof. It was only then I saw Playboy naked women posters that Barry had thoughtfully plastered all over the cockpit roof. I liked his style and wondered how I could try the same thing in the Vampire I used to fly from Laverton. The thought of a Courts Martial for defacing Her Majesty's fighter, soon stopped that thought in its tracks.
After the Anson was loaded for the return to Moorabbin, Barry invited me to fly from the left seat. It was a lovely gesture which I have never forgotten. Thanks, Barry - if you are still around the traps in 2014.
