Enough please. What has not been exposed and probably never will be is the following:
1. The 'falsification of records' relates to two sorties. The first, when CT serials were entered into the auth sheets after each pilot flew a CT sortie. Doubt was cast by the SI over the amount of time the pilots had to fulfil these serials. No evidence was provided that this could not have been done in the time logged. The second was noticed in Flt Lt Cunninghams logbook, after the SI noticed he had entered a 40 minute sortie when the auth sheets showed 35. After an investigation, this issue was cleared.
2. The SI knowingly printed in their report an incorrect 'timeline'. They were informed of the errors in their timeline by the Team Leader but chose to ignore the actual timeline used. The actual timeline gives an additional 4 minutes from step to walk from that printed in the report (12 mins), which allows the pilots plenty of time to complete ALL checks, F700 etc. Also, the SI references the RAFAT timeline against other Hawk users which is misleading in the context of RAFAT ops. A RAFAT brief takes between 5-15 minutes, which includes all domestic aspects of the sortie, an emergency, loser plan and out-brief. Extensive use of SOPs helps greatly in this regard. The SI NEVER observed a RAFAT brief-walk-chek-in-taxy-take-off so has no context. Some of you question integrity...
3. The sim issue is irrelevant as the amount of time flown in the sim counts towards nothing. The pilots were completing their emergency sims in approximately 35-40 mins, more than enough time to complete the required emergencies and this is backed up by the testimonies of the sim instructors. Claiming one hour in your logbook for the sim might not be correct, but it is irrelevant to any currencies as the sim counts for nothing except a 'tick' that an emergency sim has been conducted. Also, currencies were questioned in the context of the number of sims conducted per year. This relates to a technicality in the Reds Display Directives that states that 6 sims should be completed annually. This was only in the Directives as the 22 Gp sim currency is 2 months. However, the Team are allowed a 1 month extension (3 months total) at the discretion of the DDH (Cmdt CFS) which they use every year when they go to Cyprus. So every year, they do 5 (and a half) but are always 'current'. This 'error' in the Directives has been amended with the removal of the '6 per year' line. Incidentally, all non-22 Gp Hawk operators (100 Sqn and the Navy have 3 month currencies for emergency sims). This issue was investigated and cleared.
4. The ONLY difference the Reds had to aircraft checks was the following: the FRCs say to close the canopy, remove pins and then start the GTS. These checks had been modified decades before to the following: Start the GTS, close the canopy (while the GTS is starting) and then remove pins. Engine is then ready to start as it takes 20 secs for the GTS to come online. While this may have been incorrect iaw the FRCs, this procedure had never been questioned by annual FSV, CFS Trappers (the Reds do them annually, not every 2 years as stated by Orders) or any external visitors, of which their are dozens every year. The reason the Team did this was to warn all engineers that the canopies were about to be closed and that they should 'hide' under the aircraft in case of inadvertent MDC initiation. With up to 11 aircraft starting at once and lots of engineers close to the aircraft, this was considered best practice but has since been changed.
5. The SI claimed that pilots were logging IF when they (the SI) believed the weather conditions did not allow it. They went through met records for one day during the 2011 display season when all pilots claimed IF. Met records showed BKN cloud up to 9000ft on this day and the SI did not believe this was enough to fly on instruments. BKN can be 5-7 octas of cloud and they based this accusation on this. This issue was investigated and cleared.
6. As a result of the conduct of this SI, the SI process itself is being looked at by the MAA (new DG) with a view to modification; specifically the right of reply by the Service. While some good work was undoubtedly done by elements of this SI, especially regarding the over-tightening issue and the forensic level examination that looked at how the handle MAY have been moved into an unsafe condition, many of the 'other factors' were opinion-based with little solid evidence to back them up. Many of them were thoroughly investigated and cleared, yet they remain in the report.
7. While there was no mandated Air Safety Management Plan completed by the Cmdt at the time, it had been started. When Eggman was killed, the Cmdt made the decision to spend his time with the Team and look them in the eye every day to make sure they were good to go, instead of sitting in his office writing this management plan. He ultimately pulled the plug on RAFAT flying in early September (2 weeks before the end of the 2011 season) over concerns with one of the pilots who was not coping well. If he had not, there may well have been an accident. In my eyes, that is good supervision.
There will always be those of you who will want to believe every aspect of this SI and how gash the Reds might be, but I would urge caution before you jump to conclusions. They are every bit as professional as they were when they were on the frontline and take great pride in what they do. Please consider what I have taken the time to write before you have hung the Team as guilty.