I also repeat the question. Were ANY OTHER BOLTS FOUND PINCHING THE SHACKLE during the fleet checks or was this one the only example ?
Excellent question, but worth pointing out a related MoD policy (Adam Ingram, when Min(AF), and successors) that a trend failure can now only exist in the tail number in question. That is, it may be considered a trend if it occurs more than once in a tail number, but not if it occurs once in every aircraft in the fleet.
Interesting concept, which explains much, with roots in the Chief Engineer policy of 1991 to cease all fault monitoring tasks. That recurring date again.
To be fair to the MAA, they haven't said they agree with this; but neither have they disagreed and continue to support the DE&S authors of the Ministerial brief. (Your balls hurt if you sit on the fence too long).
I disagree by the way.
The main point here is that the fleet inspection occurred after the accident, yet the problem was known beforehand. Exactly the same happened prior to Tornado ZG710/patriot shootdown (2003) - 2 dead - so lessons aren't being learned. Don't be blinded by any MoD spin that no other faults were found. The death was avoidable and MoD policy militated against avoidance.