This incident begs several questions – with hindsight.
Why GA. What is the procedural rationale for GA if some capability remains; does it assume only the worst case visibility? Similarly, would the procedure apply during a VMC practice approach? How are the procedures evaluated, taught, and reviewed?
Are the crew expected to manage such dilemmas?
If there have been similar inappropriate selections of AT disc opposed to GA, were there any safety reports, did the manufacturer know, was the design evaluated and approved with such actions considered? Assuming safety reports are submitted, who considers and acts on them?
Why didn’t the AP initially disengage with pilot overpower. Normally this is a certification requirement to prevent back-driving the trim, as in this incident. AP approach settings might use higher torques thus requiring more overpower force, but due to the proximity to the ground other monitors are normally provided, if so what, when, why not?
Perhaps the investigation should have asked these questions, also the others above.
The ASAGA study referred to in the report is at
http://www.bea.aero/etudes/asaga/asaga.study.pdf
Highly recommended reading of Sections 3 Flight Crew Survey - Problems, 4 Simulation, and 6 Analysis, all of which identify opportunities for improving safety.