Air Rabbit:
I’m quite sure that some of my acquaintances (both the positive and the “not so positive”) at the NTSB would probably chuckle at the fact that I’m writing this, but …
I know of absolutely ZERO accident investigations – anywhere on the planet – that are not subject to at least some degree of influence – political, financial, personal, professional, and, likely, a whole litany of others. Additionally, the magnitude of each individual influence is directly influenced by the size of the public interest and the degree of the financial ramifications (i.e., penalties, law-suits, operating changes, replacements, etc., etc.) that are, or may become, involved. For whatever it may be worth, after having been involved in my fair share (perhaps more than my “fair” share) of airplane accident investigations – through one means or another – I remain substantially impressed with the work-product routinely generated by the US NTSB. From my personal observations, the NTSB-quote provided (above) is pretty much the plain and simple truth. In other words, with the numbers of accident investigations conducted by the NTSB (…and, by the way, those investigations involve all modes of transportation in the US – air, automotive/trucking, rail, maritime, and probably others that escape me at the moment) and the fact that ALL such investigations are all directly affected by the resources available to them – both personnel AND monetary – it is only logical that someone, someplace HAS to make decisions as to how much of those limited resources are to be allocated for any individual case. Don’t get me wrong – I have had my share of disagreements with this particular federal agency (some of you may recall my vociferous challenges – and I use “vociferous” as a diminutive term, to say the least – to the conclusions reached in the investigation of the B737 departure crash at Washington National Airport in January of 1982) but my respect for the mission of that agency and, particularly for the individuals working there, has not been clouded or reduced. While it may be an emotional response to “feel” that the NTSB priorities are “misplaced,” when all of the locations and methods that may be available to influence the actual priorities are considered – the bottom line simply has to be that despite whatever concerns or specific objections may occur, the end result is as good as it could possibly be … as long as humans are involved in the decision making. AND from that point forward, it’s up to all of us to take what information is provided and apply it to the way we and our respective organizations conduct our respective professions.
At the technical staff level I agree with you.
At the IIC level it is more spotty. Some are great, some are not, especially at the field office level.
At the management staff level it is more politics than science.
At the Board member level it is all over the map and has always been so.
I know for a fact that the BE1900 accident, although (unfortunately) a field office investigation, did have the technical assistance of a very sharp ATC expert at NTSB headquarters.
So, there is no doubt the Board has the necessary technical information and could have easily made a public technical statement long before now about the deadly aspects of ATC that day and the lack of altitude awareness on the part of the ill-fated crew. That type of safety alert could have been, should have been, issued and at very little incremental cost.
There is far more for pilots to learn from the BE1900 accident than from the UPS AB 300 accident.