Quote from RAT 5:
"From those in the know was the TV program accurate? [...]
"Regarding the choice & change of RWY, it stated that the only data given by AF was from the tarmac RW02, but on arrival they saw the crowd aligned along RW34 and so deviated at the last moment causing them to be high and hence at idle thrust."
I haven't seen the documentary, but that argument doesn't make much sense to me.
Approaching from the south, the direct distance to the threshold of Rwy 02 would have been several hundred metres LESS than to the thresholds of the grass strips 34L and 34R, which are several hundred metres further north.
According to the CVR, the first pilot positively to identify the airfield was the PF (captain) at about 1244:00, just as the PNF was busy initiating his first R/T call to Habsheim. At 1244:01, the PF announced (in French): "There's the field. It's there... you have it, eh?"
That was 98 seconds before first impact. The published DFDR print-out starts 4 seconds later, at 1244:05, with a time-frame notated as TGEN 240 seconds. (The last uncorrupted time frame is TGEN 334 seconds, and is considered to be the point of first impact with the trees on the north boundary of the airfield, defined as "t". So TGEN 240 is t -94 seconds.)
Habsheim ATC did not suggest that they fly along Rwy 34, and it seems doubtful that the crowd line along it would have been visible at this point.
At t -94, IAS and GS were 202 kt, passing height just over 1000 ft above the airfield elevation, and position about 3.5 nm SSE of the Rwy 02 threshold on a HDG of 336 (probably magnetic, but variation was only 2W). Had they decided at that point to position for Rwy 02, a rapid swerve to the left would have been necessary, shortly followed by a right turn to line up. That would have only increased the track distance-to-run to about 4 nm, a negligible difference from going direct to the thresholds of the grass strips.
In either straight-in scenario, there simply was not enough distance to get the height and speed off in accordance with the game plan. They needed an orbit or, preferably, a close circuit of the airfield while they slowed down and configured for the flypast.
In the event, they continued more or less straight towards the airfield, perhaps assessing the situation. There were no significant heading changes until t -50, with a 5-degree left turn; and t -25, when the a/c started a gentle right turn of about 15 deg on to its final heading of about 345 for the flypast of Rwy 34.
My interpretation of the DFDR suggests that the a/c was still descending as it passed over the threshold of Rwy 02. At t -13 it levelled off, at 60 ft baro on the QFE, just before the threshold of the shorter grass strip 34R. IAS was 132 kt - still more than 15 kt above the planned display speed. Hence the maintenance of idle thrust.