Originally Posted by
CONF iture
Not even the English version of the report or the annexe VII ...
If you use the report search facility on the BEA's website, you'll note that even today the BEA do not routinely publish a report in a language other than French unless one of the major parties involved comes from - or unless the accident itself occurred - outside of France. No "hiding" there.
Annexe VII covers the period directly concerning the accident only - it was, and in many cases still is, standard practice for most agencies to do this. Any data from other phases of the flight is quoted in short form during the narrative section of the report - again, nothing "hidden" and nothing untoward.
I was tempted to report your post for this unnecessary personal swipe, but haven't done so as I don't want to seem petty.
For what its worth I've deliberately restricted my input to the computer systems design and specification as much as possible - any comment of mine outside of those bounds only refers to aspects that can be understood with a little basic aero knowledge plus a decent level of reading comprehension (or explicitly quotes people with the requisite qualification when responding to them).
Far more qualified minds than mine have been picking apart the technical and piloting aspects - not to mention the operations angle in which, as the BEA correctly stated in their report, AF are deservedly found significantly wanting (I found gums' sense of disbelief very appropriate on that point). You've got A320 line pilots both current and former - as well as at least one A320 TRE - saying that the aircraft behaviour seems normal.
From my point of view, and I've said this before, I take back my initial reservations about going over this again because I've learned a whole new raft of information for which I am very grateful. I came into this new discussion ready to defend my existing position that the BEA report was fit for purpose and the aircraft's behaviour expected, but prepared to be open to change that opinion if evidence showed otherwise - I have to say that the new or clarified information uncovered has tended to strengthen that opinion (for what little my opinion is worth) rather than undermine it.
As far as the non-technical aspects of the aftermath go, it seems to me that it was the parties acting for Capt. Asseline and the union who showed more interest in pursuing a predetermined agenda than the judiciary, Airbus or the BEA. Of the latter three parties, it is the BEA who in retrospect come across as by far the most even-handed, going to considerable lengths to take evidence, both primary and secondary (from all parties) into consideration when trying to determine what happened. The oft-repeated myths that the authorities sought to solely blame the flight crew, ignored allegations made by Asseline and the SNPL and tampered with flight data simply do not stand up to scrutiny when even a cursory review of the evidence is undertaken.
I do have some sympathy for Capt. Asseline, because while his judgement skills regarding conduct of the flight undoubtedly fell short of the standards required, he and his flight crew were poorly prepared and briefed by the airline prior to the flight (and the airline subsequently had no qualms about using a contradictory rule regarding minimum altitude for display flights to throw him under the bus). Not only that, but as Chris Scott suggests, I'm beginning to think he was poorly advised by those representing him - leading him away from what may have been a reasonable argument against the airline and instead convincing him to pursue allegations of technical failure against the manufacturer, a much more difficult proposition legally, but more in keeping with their long-held desire to score points against Airbus.
That it can be inferred such advice was given to an undoubtedly traumatised man wrestling with his own sense of responsiblity - of which a natural psychological factor is denial - does little to endear them in my opinion.