Thanks, EMIT.
This paragraph is what I was interested in:
Failures
When there is an AT failure while on an ILS, you will notice that an AP is just a dumb limited machine – its task is to maintain the aircraft on the ILS LOC and G/S and so it does – the speed is the responsibility of the AT.
If you don’t notice the result (speed dropping below command speed), the AP keeps trimming all the way into the stall. If you then initiate a GA at a late stage, the very aft trimmed state plus the pitch up effect of the engine thrust may overpower the capabilities of the AP. Pitch may increase quickly to abnormally high values. If control is taken over manually, pilots may be surprised by the unusual amount of forward stick that is necessary, due to daily habit of small control forces they may be hesitant to forcefully put the controls where they belong and may forget to trim simultaneously.
As I was interested in the Aiana and the Russian accident, your reply satisfies my curiosity and helps me to understand all the mosed and connections between the systems.
Although I flew several high-tech lites, including the first FBW jet besides Concorde, we had very limited AP functions for the most part. Being a single-seater, I was a big proponent of the AP to reduce workload when there was a "change in plans" requiring an alternate or a different approach. The second thing was that we had very responsive controls, so controlling pitch on a GA was no big deal. However, the only jet I was familiar with that used the AP for tactical stuff was the F-111 and its terrain following system. The rest required us to manually control pitch and heading by follwing a steering dot when using the TFR system ( A-7D). Gotta tellya, it was a life saver down low in crappy WX, and was like a cosmic enhanced GPWS, so we could get an up command way early when a granite cloud was a few miles ahead.
Thanks, man.