Thanks Zorab.
You highlight something which I was assuming, ie that the fuel recovered by AAIB was not in a location where it could be used, and therefore as far as the engines were concerned didnt exist.
A couple of other thoughts which you have prompted:
-Would the various en route fuel checks and recalculations not be corrupted by invalid fuel contents readings?
-Would they be able to reliably perform "seat of the pants" fuel consumption assessments on a bifurcated sortie like this? When they took of (and remembering we dont know this, I am assuming it) they were just tasked to travel a very very short distance to an incident on a railway line. 400Kgs would have been more than they could conceivably use, and in any event they could refuel in minutes. I doubt whether any undue attention was paid to fuel ( and I dont intend any criticism by that remark). The Dalkeith request changed everything, and I have to question whether the crew could reliably retrospectively reconstruct fuel consumption characteristics without reference to the fuel gauges.
- Prior to April 2013 and the formation of Police Scotland, this aircraft was a Strathclyde resource, and would not have operated many west east west sorties like this. I have no insight as to how it was operated thereafter, but there may not be the body of operational endurance information which you suggest in relation to this flight.
- I know I am assuming tasking for the Dalkeith leg arose after takeoff, but if it did, it would throw much of the preflight briefing out of the window, certainly the parts relating to fuel requirements for the mission.
- you state that the fuel remaining was below MLA, (which suggests that like me, you believe all fuel remaining was drained by the AAIB). Does this not confirm that all of the checks to which you refer had gone seriously pear shaped?
Last edited by falcon900; 17th Jan 2014 at 13:20.