Engines,
Thanks for the thoughtful post.
I think the Marines could indeed make an excellent case for having CAS that is not dependent on large bases with long, well maintained concrete runways or a carrier strike group.
But that's not a case for a $138-million (total procurement cost full rate in FY2012$) stealth supersonic fighter. If my threat environment calls for that, dollars to doughnuts they also have ASCMs and AIP submarines and I would be a total loony to send in a Marine force without the EA, AEW and ASW that come with a CSG.
The second issue is that the Marines have not operated from austere bases very much, even with the Harrier, because it is difficult and restrictive. "Once per war" is not far off. Since I have still not seen a an F-35B VL or RVL on to anything other than AM-2-shielded asphalt, a refractory-concrete pad or a steel deck (almost six years into the F-35B flight test program), pardon me if I remain skeptical.
If 80 per cent of sorties are STOVL, I suspect that this is recognized. The remaining 20 per cent would be about right to cover normal ship operations (11 big amphibs is the target, 6 aircraft the normal detachment, only some of those amphibs being deployed with aircraft at any given time.)
Neither is this a "too late to turn around" issue. The Marines need to look to their future. If they end up with a lot of very high-cost kit that is expensive to operate (V-22 as well), the whole concept of forcible entry against an active threat will get questioned seriously.
I would give the Marines the A-10s for expeditionary ops, and restart the OV-10 (with DIRCM, laser-guided rockets, cheap SAR, ESM and satcoms) for the LHA/LHDs.