I've read again and again "there is no money" ignoring the inconvenient fact that joe Taxpayer has in fact already paid enough to equip several squadrons of new maritime patrol aircraft and the money has been utterly wasted. This is not entirely the fault of service chiefs but neither are they blameless!
It's very easy to throw up ones hands and say "they" are to blame but until the procurement system is sorted, we will continue to waste billions. If any company had bungled a procurement to this extent, most of the board and top management would have been dismissed. Has anyone been censured, let alone sacked..? It would be nice to think that the lessons have been learned but I wouldn't bet on it.
Quite.
Lacking a public inquiry into the waste, my recommendation to anyone here is to write to your MP and ask him to acquire the Nimrod RPMA/N2000/MRA4 Post Project Evaluation (PPE) report. It is mandated, and PPEs are the method by which MoD (allegedly) "learns lessons".
Only they don't. Why?
First, PPEs are thrown in the bin if they contain any embarrassing truths. Right up front in an accurate MRA4 report would be the FACT that the actions of a few 3 Star RAF officers (e.g. successive AMSOs) in the late 80s/early 90s denuded MoD of both funds and staff to permit such a programme to be stable or viable. For example, funding to maintain Safety Cases was withdrawn, which is why the MR2 one was pants, meaning MRA4 had no stable baseline.
To make it stable the programme manager (and because it was an RAF programme this would be a relatively senior person - the RN and Army are generally happier to have competence over rank in charge, whereas the RAF equates the two) would have to highlight the actions of his senior predecessors, which seldom happens. He hamstrings himself from Day 1 through this self preservation. It also creates a difficult tension in his team; for example, on RMPA there was an immediate outcry from very experienced RAF and civilian engineers who predicted exactly what would go wrong. When this happens, motivation is hard because you're just waiting for the inevitable sh**storm. There is a constant outflow from the programme because if is dispiriting knowing you are going to fail, through no fault of your own.
I still have the PPE I wrote in 2000 on a related programme, that warned the mutual 2 and 3 Stars of these very points. It detailed every single activity required to make the programme viable, and how it overcame the fact that the resources had been declined by the same 2 Star. It concluded the programme was successful because the 2 Star was completely ignored.
It merely repeated many previous reports. I was carpeted, and told that it would not be recorded or actioned because there was a new rule requiring PPEs only to be submitted two years after completion; whereas hitherto it was a living document and problems were reported immediately. This was the same ethos that scuttled the constant reporting and feedback mandated in the Safety Management System. In other words, the person who knew what to put in the PPE would have to be recalled from his next post to write it, which as you know is never going to happen. To make sure it didn't, the files would be destroyed. That is why I don't think there is an accurate MRA4 PPE. Too many people, especially some named and praised by Haddon-Cave, would be exposed.
So, not only do MoD refuse to learn from successful programmes (i.e. the majority), the act of protecting the guilty means they can't learn from mistakes either.
Yes, the procurers made some relatively minor mistakes on Nimrod, and it is great sport castigating them, but as ever the Services (especially the RAF) only look at the final act. The Systems failure that undermined their ability to do the job left procurers floundering from the outset. Of course, MoD personnel policy (jobs for the boys, no experience required) meant many didn't realise they were floundering. Again, that is a systems fault, not individual. It needed one person with balls to declare planning blight at this stage and you would still have an MPA capability. And it would have been delivered more or less on time (around 2004, as per original plan; given a pre-requisite programme had an ISD of 2003 it was never earlier despite the N2000 moniker). That ISD was achieved, 5 months early, 30% under cost and to a better spec, but no-one asks why. Again, too embarrassing.
There is a common thread here folks and the solution involves streamlining the entire procurement/acquisition system, empowering the programme manager (instead of him often being a junior in the "team") and chopping out at least 2 levels of "management" from DE&S and DEC. For a start, where was the management oversight on Nimrod (and Chinook Mk3 - same person)? His primary role was to review at least the top 10 risks each month, and oversee mitigation. Well, from 1995-2001 he was also my 2 Star and the only times I spoke to him he told me gross, deliberate waste, fraud and unsafe aircraft were "of no concern to MoD(PE)" and he was not interested in hearing of risks. Right, strip out that line of management. Next.....