Kharon:
Most of the regulatory decisions CASA makes are such that conformity with authoritative policy and established procedures will be conducive to the achievement of these outcomes. From time to time, however, decision-makers will encounter situations in which the strict application of policy, in the making of a decision involving the exercise of discretion, would not be appropriate. Indeed, in some cases, the inflexible application of policy may itself be unlawful.
This preface and the following Introduction, explains the way in which the policy and processes set out in this manual are to be used by all CASA’s personnel when making decisions in the performance of their functions, the exercise of their powers and the discharge of their duties. It also explains the processes to be followed if it appears that a departure from policy is necessary or appropriate.
Ah yes the the not entirely legally sanctioned black ops loophole that can be found in the Foreword of the more important FF COMs/SOPs.
Yes indeed Kharon there are some interesting Punch and Judy side shows in the Avmed world that are definitely worth expending some grey matter energy on, the conundrum will leave many scratching their wooden heads, their expandable noses and of course their donkey ears....
Another point of interest are the 'play the man' tactics used, and it's easy pickings. Any pilot medical condition is easily isolated as 'individual', and may, with some impunity be viewed on a 'case by case' basis.
&
This takes almost every medical argument to a 'one-on-one' bun-fight, where a preordained, subjective outcome may be argued. Bloggs is on his (and or her) own, left to face down 'the authority' without comparable resources.
Or in other words as a wise old Coroner
once said ..."
ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached.."
The one truly notable exception to this FF Avmed modus operandi is of course the Hempel case, which left most of us scratching our wooden heads at about post #673 of the Barry Hempel Inquest thread...
As chance would have it there was a parallel but diametrically opposing similar case that involved most of the same players involved in the Hempel Inquest
:Hazelton and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2010] AATA 693 (10 September 2010)
From paragraph 75 through to paragraph 133 we get the FF PMO
..."very long winded 'statistical' argument, which proves little"...however IMO the following quote is significant in the context of the Dr B H McPherson (Deputy President) final decision:
130. He was asked by the Deputy President about his use of the term "likelihood". He affirmed that he distinguished between a possibility and a likelihood. He explained that what he meant by "likely" is not necessarily what he meant by "likelihood"; he would choose "likely" for "a real, substantial risk", but he would not necessarily be meaning "likelihood". By likelihood, he was referring to the concept of the possibility, or chance, that an event will occur. He did not consider the extent of the brain damage or injury, in working out whether something was likely or not.
131. Mr Harvey also asked him about the "1% Rule", and if the International Civil Aviation Organisation supports the application of this in aeromedical decision making. He answered that the Organisation, which represents 189 nations, has avoided doing this, although some jurisdictions, such as Europe and Canada, are making attempts to quantify risk numbers.
132. When cross-examined, he said that, for a commercial pilot seeking certification, he would be "looking at" an acceptable absolute risk in the range of 2‑2.5%. However, he had not yet discussed in his evidence how he had made the decision about Mr Hazelton's absolute risk of epilepsy.
133. Although Dr Drane told us that Dr Navāthé had been directly involved in making the decision about Mr Hazelton, we heard no evidence from him concerning his assessment of Mr Hazelton's case.
Now the 1% rule is perhaps best described in paragraphs 359-367 in statements made by another common player in these Avmed shennanigans Dr Rob Liddell:
Dr Robert William Liddell, Medical Practitioner
359. Dr Liddell has practised medicine for nearly 40 years, is an airline pilot, and a Designated Aviation Medical Examiner. His aviation career began with the Western Australian section of the Royal Flying Doctor Service, of which he became Medical Director, and later President; and he currently is a Board member. After six years as company Doctor to the British airline Dan Air, during which he flew as a pilot more than 2400 hours on Boeing 727 aircraft, he returned in 1988 to Australia to be CASA Director of Aviation Medicine for the next eight years. He is an Academician of the International Academy of Aerospace Medicine, and was a former President of the Aviation Medicine Society. He has prepared two statements.
360. In his first statement he has briefly reviewed some of his initiatives in aviation medicine.
361. His second statement has addressed that of Mr Macmillan, and he has taken Mr Macmillan's three main points.
362. First, Dr Liddell stated that, because modern aircraft are highly automated, although they are designed to be operated by two pilots, it has been demonstrated many times that one pilot can safely operate the aircraft if the other is incapacitated.
363. Second, with regard to pilot incapacity degrading safety, Dr Liddell provided information about the research conducted in 1984 by Dr Chapman of British Caledonian Airways. With the company's airline pilots in the company's jet aircraft simulator, he conducted 1300 exercises using two sudden incapacitation protocols, obvious, and subtle, of the handling pilot at a critical stage of flight. He had shown that the risk of losing the aircraft in these circumstances was 0.2%.
364. Subsequently the International Civil Aviation Authority accepted the concept of a medical certification restricted to the pilot operating "as or with co-pilot". Taking the level of the statistical risk target for safety as an observed airline accident rate at 1 per one million flight hours, the level of risk incapacitation for a pilot in a two crew aircraft has been accepted at 1 per cent per year or less. Dr Liddell stated:
This has been rigorously tested since that time and worldwide licensing authorities have not found reason to change this risk level.... There have been no accidents as a result of incapacitation of a person having this restriction since its inception 25 years ago.
365. Mr Macmillan's third man point referred to a pilot's in-flight incapacitation from an epileptic seizure. Dr Liddell stated that the greater concern has been with subtle incapacitation, such as a stroke, or partial seizure, but these are readily dealt with on the flight deck when recognised by the other pilot. As for the more severe grand mal epileptic fit, although physically intimidating, he remarked:
The shaking is usually of low amplitude almost like a tremor... [unlikely] to either disconnect the auto pilot or result in interference with the controls".
366. Dr Liddell observed that Mr Macmillan would not have been "privy" to the "enormous amount of research and statistical work that went into the International Civil Aviation Authority supporting a restricted medical certificate in the 1980s".
367. Dr Liddell was not called to give evidence at the hearing.
"Unfortunately, like all old toys, once a puppet passes its use by date inevitably it is not very long before the strings are cut and the discarded toy is sacrificed on the 'bonfire of the vanities'! "
Maybe Dr Pinnochio has passed his use by date 
; his nose has grown just a little too long, the paint is fading & chipped, the strings are loose and those bloody ears...
Probably already considered..
..but seriously (for a Sundy without any cricket..
) maybe the CVD boys'n'gals should seriously consider enlisting the help of some of the Hazo experts and refer to the 1% rule??
