Back in 1969 I left the RAAF after 18 happy years and joined DCA. On arrival in Melbourne I was given a dark gloomy office with no windows at the DCA Headquarters in Aviation House 188 Queen St. In the next office was my immediate boss - a former wartime Lockheed Hudson pilot who fought the Japs in the South Pacific. Many of the people I worked with in Aviation house were also former wartime RAAF aircrew, most of whom were bored out of their mind in DCA.
I discovered that on or around the 11th Floor was the DCA Technical Library. It was a fascinating place of shelf upon shelf of ancient and contemporary aviation books, hundreds of flight safety magazines from UK, USA, Canada and of course the DCA magazine Aviation Safety Digest. It was in another DCA building (Air Liquide House) in South Melbourne,where I had the pleasure of first meeting the editor of ASD, Mac Job and his able assistant Dick McLean. We have remained in contact to this day.
At the DCA Library there were multiple copies of each magazine and I felt it was my bounden duty to liberate these spares and give them a good home (Mulgrave, where I lived). Some of these magazines were bound copies by L.H. Moon & Son Pty Ltd of Melbourne. I still have a bound copy, rescued from the DCA library, of the 1968-1969 editions of the United States Air Force flight safety magazine called "Aerospace Safety".
Following the theme of this thread on Good Airmanship, I thought readers may be interested to read selected examples from USAF Aerospace Safety where good airmanship saved the day. The Vietnam war had started and of course there was no shortage of incidents of the type seldom experienced by todays civilian aircrew. Often, the lessons learned are the same, regardless of how long ago.
For example:
On 14 March 1967, in Vietnam, Major Dubberly as instructor Pilot, with First Lieutenant Jach co-pilot and Staff sergeant Wolpert as flight engineer, took off in a C-7A (Caribou) with 17 passengers. As the aircraft was climbing through 4500 feet the aircraft received ground fire and a slight smoke odour was noticed by the crew. All instruments and circuit breakers were monitored with no abnormal indication noted. The side windows of the Caribou were closed and the smell diminished. Approximately 10 minutes later an acrid smoke odour was again detected. Smoke in the cabin was now affecting the passengers eyes but the smoke source could not be located. Because the intensity of eye irritation was increasing, Sergeant Wolpert opened the aft cargo door to help alleviate the smoke.
Lt Jach started a descent. While the aircraft was passing through 5000 feet, the No 1 engine fire light for zone 2 and 3 illuminated. Engine inflight fire procedures were accomplished but the propeller would not feather. Both fire extinguisher bottles momentarily diminished the now blazing fire which was burning well aft of the firewall and back toward the left wing. Maximum power was applied to No 2 engine and a 3-400 foot per minute descent was the best performance attainable.
At 1,000 feet, attempts to lower the landing gear proved unsuccessful; the gear controls had been burned away by this time. With maximum power on No.2 engine, No 1 windmilling, and zero flaps, Major Dubberly and Lt Jaach continued the approach. By now many pieces had burned off the No 1 engine nacelle and flames were engulfing part of the wing.
Major Dubberly took control of the aircraft, crossed the end of the runway, and touched down on the fuselage. The aircraft slid 657 feet and came to rest on the centre-line of the runway. All power was turned off and the 17 passengers and crew evacuated the still burning aircraft.
Subsequent investigation cited enemy action as the cause of the fire. Because of Major Dubberly's and Lt Jach's crew coordination, skill and professionalism, and Sergent Wolpert's outstanding ability in re-briefing and controlling the passengers, all aboard escaped without injury.
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Centaurus comment: The above incident demonstrates the startling rapidity with which engine fires can propagate in the air with no guarantee that in-built fire extinguishers will be effective. Among airline crews there are sometimes differing opinions on the best way to treat in-flight engine fire warnings.
Some pilots argue that there is no urgency to take action since with pod-mounted engines it is likely the engine will fall away if fire weakens the installation. Others disagree, since that sort of advice is a personal point of view not backed up in aircraft manufacturers flight operations manuals. Most manuals this writer has read, emphasise the need to take prompt action in event of engine fire warning; with the caveat the pilot should ensure the aircraft is under control first. Surely that should be self-evident.
Last edited by Centaurus; 11th Jan 2014 at 06:32.