SASless,
"...Familiar with the RAF refusal to provide Coastal Command the assets it needed...."
Lets actually throw some facts at that comment shall we? The PQ-17 tragedy occurred in July 1942. In 1942 the RAF was very short of four engined long range aircraft, especially ones suited to maritime reconnaissance. The Short Stirling and Handley Page Halifax were only entering service in small numbers. The best long range assets available to Coastal Command were US built Liberators and PBY Catalinas, and UK built Sunderlands.
As to the numbers game, in Feb 1942 (the closest date I could readily find to July 1942) Coastal Command had 44 Squadrons including 5 4 engined and 4 PBY.
In March 1943 Bomber Command had 62 Sqns, only 36 of which were 4 engined, with considerable numbers of 2 engined Wellingtons and Whitleys still around. In direct comparision, in Feb 1943 Coastal Command had 48 Sqns, of which 16 were 4 engined or PBY.
I would suggest that a ratio of 62:48 does not imply that Coastal Command were starved of aircraft. Indeed 48 Sqns shows the importance that was given to airpower in the maritime environment. Yes, Bomber Command was bigger, and the bomber offensive was a high priority, but you must consider the situation at the time. With (apart from the situation in North Africa) limited ability to "take the fight to the enemy/strike back" other than from the air, the Bomber Offensive was seen as the only way seen to keep the pressure on until the infamous "second front" was opened. Striking back was an important psychological, as well as practical, strategy.
Various comments have already been made about Churchill. It should be noted that the one thing that "kept him awake at night" was his fear over losing the "Battle of the Atlantic". He certainly saw it as a main long term priority, and aircraft were well recognized as a way to neutralize and eventually destroy the U-Boat threat.