Let me clarify some position:
There are two very separate issues at stake. One is the economical, the other the safety aspect. We all agree that we want safety to come before economics.
This thread deals with the legal possibility of 4-engined aircraft to continue almost unlimited with an engine failure. Although we should not compare with twins, because they are bound to land asap in the same situation, we can’t discard a comparison because ultimately the advantage of being able to continue represents an economical advantage, or no one in his right mind would continue with a failure of a vital component if not.
There is an inherent danger to blur the line between the two issues, safety and economics, if the possibility exists. The companies and their managers are only measured by profit, never by safety margins, unless there is an accident. Then suddenly however, the safety issue pops up in the public eye. Before it was only an issue to pilots, them being the only ones to effectively see the gap between the lip-service done to safety and the real situation. One smoking hole can change the whole game. Mostly only the pilots will be blamed, as they are almost always handily gone with the plane, and the companies and regulators get away with their fig-leaf and the public forgets everything with the next discount on air travel. Sometimes some managers are sacrified with the jockeys, as some mismanaged shortcuts are too blatant and very rarely a company goes completely down due to the same.
Having companies with their network and maintenance departments participate in decision making after failures is certainly logical, considering today’s data link capabilities. At the same time we can observe too many conflicts between companies and pilots concerning T&C’s and, going with it, the threatening culture that developped the last 20 years. The power shift from unions, which were admittedly often too short sighted, to profit maniacal management is obvious and not really enhancing safety.
Both of the recent engine failures on quads (BA, EK) led to diversions, even though they continued for many hours. So effectively, comparing to twin failures, the only advantage was getting closer to destination, but like twins not reaching it. So the advantage was merely an economical one because it allowed the company to prepare better for arrangements.
My point I am trying to make is: It certainly looks good to be able to prepare for such diversions and to choose a more appropriate airport with quads. In most cases the risk assessment would certainly allow a continuation. Sometimes though, the slight economical advantage fades compared to the increase in safety margin vs. routine operation.
I uphold my suspicion that (taking into account the above) the “advice” (and subtle pressure) from the company to continue, paired with the less strong position (protection) of today’s skippers leads to more biased decisions, more risk taking.
An engine failure remains a serious malfunction!