Flyboy 41
Wiggy makes the point exactly. If you are unsure, stop. But there are countless examples in aviation history where there was no uncertainty in the crew's mind, and probably here as well. This is why previous posts have talked about "confirmation bias".... visual. aural, situational cues that either do nothing to provide that uncertainty or worse, positively reinforce the perception that you are where you should be.
A classic example is Air NZ polar sightseeing tour where a DC-10 piled into the slopes of Mt Erebus. The INS entry sheet had been incorrectly prepared (reversed digits) by ground crew and the crew followed the coordinates exactly (albeit lower than the MSA due to precedent). It took them, in whiteout conditions, straight into the slopes of Mt. Erebus. The first report by inspector Ron Collinson concluded that "The decision of the captain to continue a flight at low level toward an area of poor surface and horizon definition when the crew was not certain of their position and the subsequently inability to detect the rising terrain which intercepted the aircraft's flight path". This was subsequently questioned by Justice Mahon in a Civil enquiry, which pointed out that they were not uncertain at all - the INS told them (incorrectly) where they were, but even worse, how could they know that there was poor surface definition as there should be no "surface" there and they - like most most crews - had never experienced the unique polar whiteout phenomenon.
I know the location very well and as others have said the outfield is a dark as Hades at night. The aircraft lights would give a cue for forward vision focused on the continuation of the centreline. I invite someone to replicate the situation from a 747 at night and share..if it hasn't already been done.