Good God. Do we HAVE to go through this again? Somebody shoot me...PLEASE shoot me in the head. I'd rather that happen than have one of these pointless arguments with SASless.
(And Variable Load, the post was moved over to this thread from another thread discussing the merits of flying high versus flying low. This accident was one I used as an example of the type of catastrophic failures that some pilots worry about in their irrational justification to fly low. My point was that even without the mythical "30-minute run-dry time" the crew of CHI91 had plenty of time to get the ship down and land safely. But they chose not to.
As for why the Moderators moved the post, I have no earthly idea. I don't know why the Moderators of this forum do the things they do. Sometimes I just shake my head.)
Moving on to the S-92 crash...
Look, we cannot know what any pilot was thinking right before he crashed. We cannot know what was *not* said over the intercom or radio; we only know what *was* said.
However, we know that while the SIC mentioned a couple of times that they were at the "Land Immediately" point in the emergency checklist (and the PIC certainly knew what "land immediately" meant), the PIC did not do this. And it wasn't like he merely chose to not exercise that option, for it was not an option. He consciously chose to contradict the emergency procedure. And so we have to ask ourselves why a mature, professional, properly-trained and experienced aviator would disregard such clear instructions? It even puzzled the TSB investigators.
Even though there was no direct mention of the 30-minute run-dry capability by the crew, we know that both pilots were aware of it. How do we know this? Because WE ALL are aware of it. And, despite SASless's disingenuous protestations to the contrary, the TSB did talk about it in Section 1.18.1.3 of their report. It gets to the heart of what we're saying here. The PIC balanced the risk of ditching against the risk of a MGB failure.
The decision to land or ditch immediately could hinge on the pilots' interpretation of the "land immediately" definition and their assessment of the risks associated with landing immediately versus prolonging flight to reach a more suitable landing area. One possible factor which can influence a pilot's decision-making process is the consideration of a helicopter's run dry capability. If a pilot is concerned that a loss of lubricant may have occurred, knowledge of the run dry capabilities of the aircraft is of critical importance in determining the necessary flight profile to ensure that the helicopter is landed or ditched prior to a potential failure of the MGB or related component failure due to a loss of MGB lubricant.
So it's not correct to say that the TSB report "never mentioned" the 30-minute run-dry capability. It did. Obviously. (Do some of you suffer from reading comprehension issues? I think you must.)
And it's equally not correct to say that the pilot(s) did not consider the run-dry capability of the S-92 simply because neither one of them mentioned directly. It had to play a role, as the TSB agrees.
There is no question that the PIC failed to follow the emergency procedure for the indications he was given. No question. But to say that his knowledge of the run-dry capability absolutely had nothing to do with that decision is just stupid. I mean, it's asinine. Idiotic.