Originally Posted by
vilas
I do not have access to English version of the report.
That's because there isn't one - as I've said before - all I've had to work with over the years are extracts - but I've managed to OCR and translate some of the lesser-known aspects of the report recently.
Originally Posted by
CONF iture
Not more surprising than most of you who have read or not the report are still pretending that the airplane was at alpha max.
To the best of my knowledge, no-one's claimed that, and we've already confirmed that the FCTM does not state that pulling back in High AoA Protection mode will definitely give Alpha Max - just the closest to that value that the systems can give with the flight parameters at the time. If a pilot assumes that it will give them Alpha Max precisely, then they are in error.
Originally Posted by
tdracer
OK, I'm going to duck for cover after I post this, but....
There were reports that the DFDR and CVR didn't jibe - that there was a 3 second discrepancy.
Nope - that was based on a misinterpretation of the data by the retired investigator the lawyers used to give a second opinion. Ray Davis was an excellent investigator, but he had no prior experience with DFDRs.
Posted a while back:
Originally Posted by me
DFDR matches CVR. If you are referring to Ray Davis's independent reading of the FDR, he was not experienced in dealing with the new digital models, and got it wrong.
From the document posted by Franzl months ago :
http://www.crashdehabsheim.net/Rapport%20Airbus.pdf
Mr. Davis was apparently not aware of the convention (which is apparently unique to France) that requires that the transcripts of forward accelerations are shown with a negative sign. [He is] therefore claiming that in the last seconds the negative acceleration shown in the transcript demonstrates that the aircraft was decelerating and therefore one or both engines were not providing sufficient thrust.
The flight recorders did not stop instantaneously at Habsheim. In the final report produced by the Commission of Inquiry it clearly states that -after the first impact with the trees, the CVR continued to operate for around 1.5 seconds and then stopped. The DFDR continued to operate
for around one second [after impact] then gave incoherent data for around two seconds". The exact cause as to why the recorders stopped almost simultaneously before the aircraft finally came to rest could not be determined. The most probable cause is that the power supply cables of the two recorders broke.
Additionally, as the (admittely poorly-)translated "Other Factors" section I posted earlier confirms, the official BEA report does not find that the factors leading to the crash lay with the flight crew alone - the sequence began with poor preparation and briefing materials on the part of the airline. The BEA's report does not explicitly apportion responsibility - because like other agencies that are nominally independent, yet still civil service (like the UK AAIB, ATSB etc.), their remit does not extend far enough to allow them to do so. Of course, the legal teams were counting on the press they were briefing to be unaware of that distinction.
Because the crew's lawyers were arranged by the union, it could be argued that they tried to paint a picture of a cover-up on AI's behalf, because to draw attention to the report's actual content - i.e. implicit but robust criticism of AF - would be biting the hand that fed the union's members.
For their part, AF's defence during the criminal and civil proceedings involved falling back on an old document that specified the airshow "hard floor" (i.e. minimum altitude) to be 600ft. This raises the question of how, if that rule was still in effect, they were able to sign off the Habsheim display in the first place - and it also demonstrates that it was in fact AF who were primarily responsible for the effort to have the crew "thrown under the bus".
As for "how did they end up so low and slow?", as I understand it the chain of events was set in motion during the (rushed) approach. It wasn't that the PIC was waiting for an "acceptable" (as in sufficiently breathtaking for the spectators) altitude/speed during the flypast, it was because they were so high and hot at the start of the final that they chopped off too much power.