496. Having considered the conflicting evidence, we find that the risk of post-traumatic epilepsy for Mr Hazleton is well within the acceptable medical criteria for the aviation industry. We have taken account of all of the evidence and appropriately given weight to the factors affecting the disputed facts. In determining what are acceptable limits or tolerances in this case,
we reject the oral evidence of Dr Wallis and Dr Drane and the written evidence of Dr Navāthé.
500. We find from the clinical and epidemiological evidence, Mr Hazelton’s virtually uneventful history since the accident (particularly in relation to the absence of post-traumatic epilepsy in that period), there appears to be a preponderance of weight pointing to an “inherent unlikelihood” of post-traumatic epilepsy for the applicant
[638]. In so concluding we note in a complementary way, that the respondent’s case was not uniformly robust.
In particular, we placed weight adversely for the respondent on the fact that three of the doctors, the Principal Medical Officer, Dr Navāthé and the medical officer Dr Drane, and Dr Wallis from his New Zealand consultancy, who had worked together previously had inconsistent opinions with other doctors from within CASA and with external expert opinion, and we were not satisfied that all of the views of those doctors were objective assessments. We considered Dr Drane’s evidence, who had the benefit of the opinion of Dr Hastings, the United States specialist, but
we found Dr Drane seemed unduly influenced by Dr Navāthé’s opinion.
501. We noted in particular, in July 2009 (8 months after Mr Hazleton’s assault incident), email evidence of the strong views taken by Dr Sham Tak Sum and the more moderate views of Dr Fitzgerald, both of whom are employed by CASA. Clearly, Dr Sham Tak Sum and Dr Fitzgerald would have been sympathetic to re-licensing Mr Hazelton, but
those views seemed to have been minimised by the other medical officers at CASA and that evidence is at odds with Dr Navāthé’s written statement.