If you will permit this non-flyer an attempt at playing an objective Devil's Advocate, I'd like to try taking a step back to review where I'm at.
For one thing, if we take KAL's vastly improved safety record since the top-down operational and safety overhaul a little over a decade ago into account, its apparent success certainly appears to clearly indicate that the oft-cited "cultural issues" can be overcome - this also undermines the idea (which has always made uncomfortable reading to me) that Korean/Asian culture as a whole will always be hazardous to this kind of operation.
Originally Posted by
Desert Dawg
I heard this snippet of info (Lee Kang Kuk's statement) on the radio news and my mouth hit the floor..!!!
Hi DD - I'm using this comment not to single you out, but as an example of a common thread running through recent comments.
Taken in isolation, that remark certainly is concerning, but as a firm believer in the maxim "context is everything", I felt obliged to have at least a skim-read of the whole document (kindly linked by Airbubba - see below). The first thing I noticed is that Capt. Lee's interviews span
20 pages of the document, and even just the paragraph containing that remark indicates that there was more to what was troubling him than handling the aircraft - he said that visual approaches were stressful "from the planning phase". Also:
Asked whether he was concerned about his ability to perform the visual approach, he said “very concerned, yea”. Asked what aspect he was most concerned about, he said, “the unstable approach”. He added, "exactly controlling the descent profile and the lateral profile, that is very stressful."
Now, that in itself isn't incompatible with the idea that he didn't have confidence in his manual handling skills, but let's hold that thought briefly.
Originally Posted by
Airbubba
Thanks for the link, sir - I've kept it in the quote so folks won't have to go back a few pages to get it. Any folks with the time, I'd highly recommend reading the whole thing, as it paints a vivid and complex picture that I reckon will take patience and thoroughness to pick apart.
The retired ex-pat input is largely what one would expect - which is no slight on them as people or, indeed, airmen - however, the tendency for ex-pat veterans to be suspicious of the abilities of their native (usually younger) colleagues definitely seems to be present in those interviews. That said, to give them their due the interviewees explicitly praise aspects of their colleagues at Asiana in terms of competency when it comes to using the training they've had - their concerns tend to revolve around operational matters such as the broadness of training itself and handling practice/currency. As Airbubba says above, the "automation" bugbear is covered - and eloquently so. However, the interviewees make clear that it is a generational aspect - not a specifically cultural one.
What I found especially enlightening was comparing and contrasting the aforementioned ex-pat retirees' interviews with those of the accident flight crew.
Of special note were these points from the former (emphasis mine):
He was asked how visual approaches were conducted at Asiana. He stated that pilots were seldom allowed to practice visual or contact approaches and every time he offered an FO such an approach, they would refuse or be highly resistant to the suggestion because they did not feel comfortable with it and did not have experience doing it in a B777 or other big airplane. He thought they did not feel confident and did not want to make any mistakes.
...
He stated Asiana stressed very controlled environments and was very critical of excessive descent rates
...
[Asiana's] Korean pilots were very smart and diligent within what they were allowed to do. He always knew exactly what was going to be on flight checks. He heard comments from instructors that if they changed the profile and inserted a hydraulic or electrical problem, the pilots would get the scripted problems right, but weren’t prepared for the unexpected.
...
He was asked if his initial written test when he was hired was an Asiana company test. He stated it was a test from the MOT like an ATP written exam in English, but 70% of the test was about penalties, fines or jail, for things done wrong, and these were the things he had to study.
Originally Posted by Accident flight check Captain (PNF)
In the B777 most of time crews did precision approaches and visual approaches were not common. Most captains would use the ILS as a backup to a visual approach, but for the accident approach only the localizer was available because glideslope was out of service. They used waypoints for altitude reference. There was no discussion of building a constant descent profile for guidance on the PFD.
...
Asiana pilots knew the approach to SFO is difficult.
At Asiana there was some special information on the company intranet and there was a simulator flight to SFO. Every year they train for a special airport during recurrent simulator training. In 2013 it was JFK. In 2012 it was SFO. The company considered SFO a “special” airport.
And finally, as promised, returning to Capt. Lee:
Originally Posted by Accident flight PF
Asked whether he had discussed that at all with instructors, he said yes. He said that during ground school, they would discuss the approach to SFO during tea time and how it was high.
...
He added, "Normally the instructor pilots are very alert, there is something how can I say, very alertive. Sometimes too much stressful, but he was very natural. Can say it like that way."
Asked whether the PM was fairly relaxed and did not make him feel stressed, he said he did not know because it was the first time they flew together. Asked whether other PMs seemed more “alertive” or “high key” or on top of things, or active, he said yes. They were more active and touching the instruments. Asked what the PM seemed to be doing that was different during the approach, the PF said it was hard to say because PF was flying and it was double workload, so he could not see the PM and check him.
...
Asked whether he had ever had to take the controls away from a captain because they were not seeing something or confused or disoriented, he said “no, no way.” Asked if he could imagine a situation where he would ever do that, he said “no way”.
These extracts suggest to me that, putting the manual handling/automation aspect to one side, there's a glaring disconnect in terms of joined-up thinking when it comes to CRM if this crew's experience is to be considered indicative of Asiana's practices.
They also indicate that the potential warning signs that heralded the accident go way beyond being able to put it down to a simple manual handling error and/or ethnic cultural issues.
Going back to that statement from Capt. Kim that caused so much consternation, it becomes clear that confidence in manual handling and visual approaches are only one facet of what he found "stressful". He'd been fed information that SFO was a difficult proposition back in ground school and works for an airline that seems to have a troubling emphasis on punishing any kind of performance issues - especially regarding descent rates. The check Captain states that even veteran Asiana PICs use ILS as a backup when shooting visuals at SFO.
It's a truism that even the best pilots can make horrific errors in judgment when under stress. For his upgrade checkride (a situation more stressful than usual to begin with) Capt. Kim drew a landing at an airport he'd been conditioned to think was a tough assignment, then shooting a visual approach without any ILS backup. I'm not surprised he was nervous!