PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Autopilots cause human pilots to "tune out": Pilots are "nothing more than luggage"
Old 8th Dec 2013, 19:50
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AirRabbit
 
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Southeast USA
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OK – it is clear that another apology is in order for my innate ability to use A LOT of words in expressing my feelings. Please, if you do not wish to wade through my ramblings, feel free to skip right on down to the next post.

Not long ago, I attempted to point out that it is the responsibility of the pilot flying to place (and keep) the airplane at the correct (and desired) condition – meaning the correct (desired) position, attitude, altitude, flight path, and speed (some would describe the combination of altitude, flight path and speed as “energy state,” and that’s perfectly fine). It also happens that most airline pilots have a choice as to how he/she is to accomplish the task of placing and keeping the airplane in that continually safe condition:
1) through the use of the manual controls … for elevator (pitch), ailerons (bank), rudder (yaw), throttles (power), flaps (lift and drag), and/or speed brakes (also lift and drag);… and
2) through the use of the auto-flight controls … which ultimately result in using exactly the same controls (albeit, the flaps and speed brake controls are quite likely to remain manually applied if, or where needed).

It is my not-so-humble opinion that more and more pilots are essentially abdicating his/her responsibilities as being the “pilot flying” by simply poking the autopilot button to “ON” and allowing the A/P to assume the duties of “the pilot flying.” Of course, A/Ps are very good at doing some things – but the best they can do is what those humans, who designed, assembled, and installed all of the A/P’s parameters, have allowed. That means that whatever it is that the A/P is being asked to do simply must be within those programmed capabilities – the A/P doesn’t see, hear, or feel anything. All of the A/P’s inputs are achieved through prior programming – and the term “programming” denotes some level of computation (read that as “computer) … and we all know that computers never make a mistake, they never get tired, they never quit, and they are always correct in what they determine is next in a sequence of events. Yeah … right!

Pilots are very likely aware of and know specifically where they want the airplane to be in the next second, the next minute, etc., and they have to know what is needed to ensure that the airplane will really be at, or in, those parameters at that point in time. The A/P only knows what the existing parameters are NOW, where “now” is repeated over and over at whatever speed the computer is operating. The A/P reads what parameters have been entered into the A/P controls at the same rate and then applies the controls to achieve the desired “condition” (which will be in accordance with a set of parameters previously programmed into “his” memory). If the pilot allows the A/P to fly his/her airplane, that A/P will do the best the programming will allow – and only that. Allowing the A/P to be “the pilot flying,” is, I believe, a mistake expressed in very loud and noticeable terms.

I fully support a requirement that a better course of training be instituted for all pilots who are provided the latest in computer technology on board their airplane. But that does not, in my view, release those pilots from learning everything they need to know about what, when, where, and how, to manually fly that same airplane – and to maintain an expertise for doing so through regularly manipulating the manual control systems available to the pilot in the cockpit. This will provide a more logical response, should it become necessary, whenever the airplane changes condition, position, attitude, flight path, or energy state, when the pilot flying did not desire that specific change … with or without having had the A/P connected and controlling the flight control positions … as it is the responsibility of the pilot flying to use those controls to put the airplane back into a condition, position, attitude, flight path, AND energy state that is appropriate and safe.

Certainly the airline seniority system very likely was instituted to provide a personality-free and a personal-opinion-free promotional scheme. Having been in this business for the time I have, one of the many conclusions I’ve reached is that there is more than a slight dearth in the availability of agreement of the safety level that must be achieved (significantly including the amount of risk that should be taken to complete the task at hand) and just who it should be that determines that whatever is done is, in fact, satisfactory. However, this is not a new issue … and in fact it was addressed quite some time ago, where the answer that was agreed upon was the development of a “neutral” regulatory authority. In the first decade of the 1900s, navigation problems were found to be in need of improvement along with some level of standardization. It was not long after that decision that attention broadened to include the establishment of some commonality behind the actual construction of the airplane (and a recognition that federal involvement would be necessary) and for the commonality of piloting expertise. It was thought that these steps would be necessary to help ensure the viability of a commercial venture based on aviation. Without getting into something that is very likely an unwanted history lesson, the “rest of the story” is pretty clear. The regulator constructs the proposed rules and the public gets an opportunity to comment on the good, the bad, and the ugly of those proposals. Unfortunately, for what seems to be a very long time, the “understanding” was that “those who could … flew … and those who couldn’t … wrote rules” … and, for quite a while that was more true than not. However, I believe those days have been long gone, and anyone who has had “up close and personal” dealings with any of the regulatory authorities can very likely attest to that fact. Unfortunately, any individual within that regulatory authority is, or likely will soon be, subject to the political issues that affect any government entity that ultimately answers to their public. The result is usually found to be the most effective political solution for those who are most solidly connected politically. Just to maintain some sense of rationality – this is not restricted to governmental operations … as many of you know, exactly the same issues are found in virtually any business – and particularly so for those businesses that have a multi-level management structure.

It’s my opinion that a reasonable set of training and checking rules that are followed by all airlines would prevent many executives in the airline business from believing that they can profitably run an airline by cutting some of the most severe costs – one of which is certainly training. If an airline wants to operate airplanes with minimally paid crews, but are in compliance with the rules outlining what is required to get and keep those crews qualified and current … get and keep the airplanes they operate up-to-date with inspections and maintenance practices … with landing fees essentially equal at any given airport … fuel costs essentially equal at any airport … purchase price and financing charges at least similar, and more likely close to identical from airline to airline (particularly for the same make, model, series airplanes) … resulting in those airlines having a more narrow margin regarding their direct and indirect “operating” costs - I say ... BE MY GUEST. I am not sure that anyone would be in favor of a governmentally run grouping of airlines – as that would more than likely degenerate into a single airline in each country – and I don’t see how that would serve the populace of those countries. As I see it, the bottom line is a rigorously developed and rigorously held standard of training and qualification requirements for flight crews, including the proper use of “automatic systems” and when such systems should NOT be relied upon … and, of course, an equally rigorous development of standards for maintenance and inspections on the equipment … all of which would then be operating in a commercially viable environment where the public determines the viability of additional competition in any market – and airline management will determine whether or not it’s in their best interest to chase unruly drops in passenger ticket prices to be able to support the salary/benefits packages they offer to their employees – including both maintenance and operations personnel.
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