Regarding my Functional Safety question, this edition of Air Clues includes a definition that is so far removed from the formal definition as to be downright dangerous. I won't expect a reply.
So here’s another question. As the new RAF Flight Safety organisation is responsible for “Air Safety”, who is now responsible for Fitness For Purpose (FFP)?
Most here will recall Hercules XV179 was broadly airworthy against its SOIU, but not Fit for the Operational Purpose to which it was being put (as it lacked ESF). And that the IPT Leader stated in court that he did not know how FFP was achieved or maintained, completely washing his hands of it. He also stated it was not his or the Design Authority’s responsibility to monitor or manage vulnerability, or include FFP in the Safety Case after initial delivery (1960s), which is an even more radical departure from reality. Despite the regulations placing the responsibility for continual Vulnerability Assessment fairly and squarely on the IPTL and Design Authority (or Custodian), the MoD legal man interrupted and instructed the IPTL not to answer, it was not his job (despite 00-970 mandating it upon him). The IPTL did not evade or mislead; he just answered wrongly. Let us be kind and say he wasn’t trained for the post, which can be fairly said of many in MoD. It is not their fault. Few in MoD have the necessary background to answer such detailed questions in court, but that doesn’t mean I shouldn’t have drafted them for the QC. It only took that one question to expose MoD’s (not just the IPT) failure to implement or understand simple airworthiness regulations.
But, having got this so fatally wrong, what action was taken to re-educate? Who has taken over this role, given it is not (apparently) the RAF Safety Centre?
Back to my original point. Functional Safety sits inside the Air Safety boundary, not outside as Air Clues states. Read the Tornado/Patriot papers. The IFF, as a standalone piece of kit, was physically safe. But, because its failure warnings were not integrated properly, it was functionally unsafe, rendering the aircraft vulnerable to friendly fire. As I said earlier, the recommendation to have this functional safety checked and corrected was rejected by two 2 Stars and the Directorate concerned (D/MCP); all of whom ruled that physical safety was sufficient, if the aircraft was vulnerable that was ok. And, criminally, that a false declaration should be made that it WAS functionally safe and contracts paid off in full.
My point is that I find the various pieces in this edition of Air Clues dangerously contradictory. It lacks substance and accuracy and key post holders will be thoroughly confused. If the new Safety Centre follows its mandate as published in Air Clues, I would have no confidence whatsoever that the Tornado problem, for example, would even be identified today, never mind fixed. At least in 1998 the problem was identified, demonstrating that a large part of the process worked correctly. The regs and procedures worked just fine; but they do not allow for subsequent criminal activity that amounted to sabotage. Who polices this aspect?
I just feel that MoD as a whole is a victim of change for the sake of change, when all that is needed is implementation of mandated regulations. So many new names, acronyms and definitions have been introduced that it must be very confusing. This applies to procurement as a whole, not just safety. We all know why. The prime objective is to avoid admitting past failures by individuals, so by re-writing all the regs the implication is that THEY were somehow wrong. But you should not lose sight of what the various Boards of Inquiry and Inquests all said. Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King, Hercules, Tornado....... Mandated regs were not implemented. In each case junior staffs insisted they should be, seniors staffs ordered they should not. The problem was not the regs! But no-one wants to address that unpalatable fact.