Legal
Air France :
a) Did not correctly transmitted to the authorities reports on the in-flight incidents involving Pitot probes by Thales. .
b) Did not ask (or not with enough emphasis) Airbus replace these probes with BF Goodrich deemed much less susceptible to icing.
c) Did not ask for installation on its aircraft BUSS system while most other companies are equipped.
d) The procedure laid down in time for the treatment of cases of failure of the Pitot probes (UAS) was inappropriate.
e) It has not properly trained its pilots in the case of failure or recovery from the stalls.
Airbus :
a) The Pitot probes are the root cause of this disaster.
b) Their fault that generated the cascade of events bad decisions and pilot error that led to the fatal stall.
c) Airbus selected Thales probes, regardless of feedback.
d) Continued to install them on its aircraft at the expense of BF Goodrich probes (U.S. ) which are far less susceptible to icing.
e) As a system, the A330 is not tolerant to single failure of the Pitot probes, which is contrary to all the rules of reliability and dependability . For an event of this severity (catastrophic , in the sense of the term dependability , i.e. which can cause victims), the system must be fail-safe design (it must guarantee the safety of the flight despite the failure ), and even FS / FS that is tolerant to double down.
Namely redundancy probes (actually 3 ) is false redundancy since all the sensors are the same technology therefore likely to fail at the same time , under the effect of a single common cause .. . icing.
Strictly speaking the triplex systems are supposed to parallel the different technologies , in order to avoid simultaneous failures on common mode