SAS
My post 2281 related to your post on the Air Methods accident and was:
"SAS
What do you think the crew would have been looking at displayed on the HSI if they were completing a localiser approach - it seems from the report they were tracking parallel to the localiser 1 mile left? And even if they thought the middle marker was the outer marker, why would they not have seen from the DME readout that this was incorrect?
How could such errors possibly be training, management, policy or SOP errors? Wasn't it just largely basic crew error, with mitigation for poor radar vectors? "
No SAS, "huge" was your wording actually. Read you own post again - para 2 under Humm.
Quite right, industry insider! SAS, I think you know that most people will assume you mean the company business managers when you say "management". And if not, and you mean training captains and check captains, why not be a bit more specific and say so? Or perhaps you would rather responsibility was heaped on corporate management - in fact I do find that tends to be your style. If flight crew don't believe they are trained to fly a task they shouldn't do it - and surely they should be able to be judge that. Do you think that the Sumburgh crew were not confident they were sufficiently trained to fly the NPA safely? I very much doubt it.