Originally Posted by Gums
Me thinks that Cland and Gums are on the same page for most of the philosophy here.
Yes, when it comes to technical part: we agree that HUDs and alpha displays are useful. No, regarding the human factors involved in AF447; I do not think HUD would make a difference. From technical standpoint, crew had everything they needed to deal with the situation successfully, they were just so shocked they couldn't use any of it.
Originally Posted by Gums
And as I have oft-repeated, the 'bus reversions modes are complicated and should be more straightforward.
Some might find description complicated but I find their operation very simple; just keep on flying as you were. It's not as if Airbus pilots use their protections daily.
Originally Posted by Gums
AoA is, indeed, a factor at mach approaching "critical" mach and such. The airfoils nowadays are much smoother than the old ones I flew.
Not just that: even wings designed for similar missions have widely diverging characteristics near the envelope edge. 737NG has mach trim, 320 doesn't. 330 radically changes critical alpha at high mach, 320 not so. What impact does it have on line pilots? None whatsoever. Know your limitations and procedures. If you are going too fast, slow down but not so radically you approach stall. If your alpha is to high, reduce it in reasonable and timely manner. Fly the attitude. I guarantee you it works on Stinson Trimotor, F-16 and 330 despite never having flown any of them.
Originally Posted by bubbers44
We could do it, why can't you?
Only in your imagination. In real world there were quite a few pilots losing control of their steam gauged aeroplanes and there are many modern pilots who successfully returned their glass cockpit wonders to earth after major technical malfunctions. Implying all pilots today (except quinquagenarian and higher) can't fly in critical situations flies in the face of safety records and is off-scale hypocritical.
Originally Posted by Peter H
While considering system updates, how about the generation of a message something like:
pitot redundancy lost, review UAS procedures
Design such a system and you'll get rich beyond your wildest dreams.
Point with unreliable data is that they cannot be machine-recognized and no amount of computing power can help it. Have a look at Aeroperu accident; the kind of false alerts they got and tried to resolve in vain.
Originally Posted by Dozy Wannabe
In the case of AF447 the point is somewhat moot, as the PNF is supposed to monitor ECAM and action things accordingly.
It's even more moot considering one of the few coherent and rational items on CVR is recognition that speed display has gone bad - from both sides of cockpit.
Originally Posted by hikoushi
One way or another, he used the best judgment he could manage at the time, and it steered him wrong. "But for the grace of God", any of us could be there in his place.
True! Especially bearing in mind it's one thing to consider the pitot blockade, reconfiguration laws, aeroplane energy state, warnings etc. sitting comfortably in front of the computer screen, quite another having it all thrown at you over the middle of Atlantic at 4 a.m.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
I am saying that, to maintain a safe and sensible flight profile at cruise altitude, you have to handle any large jet with kid gloves.
I was trying to point out discretely that you haven't read the part of AF447 report dealing with TAM incident which puts "kid gloves approach" straight into "old wives tales" category - something that has some basis in reality but through misunderstanding and misinterpretation diverges rapidly and significantly from it.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
Regular hand-flying practice reinforces the understanding that in level cruise-flight, regardless of turbulence or windshear, any pitch attitude more than 2 or 3 degrees above or below the norm is unsustainable unless you want to climb or descend.
Regular use of autopilot does not absolve the pilot from obligation to check instruments. Idea that you need to handfly to know your typical flight-phase-related attitude is so unrealistic it... sorry, I can't find the phrase in English.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
this discussion clearly reads across to other types, many of which might be more of a handful at the beginning of a similar UAS event than the short-body A330 in Alternate 2B, with its advantage of retaining load-factor control in pitch
This discussion needed not read across to other types if folks would only read the effing report and see that there were many similar incidents on 330/40 fleet, with every single one having far, far better outcome, therefore making long, elaborate and usually just plainly wrong discussions on FCS degradation laws unnecessary - if one's intent is to get to what made the difference in AF447 case.
Originally Posted by awblain
While I'd agree that the A340 and A330 are - intentionally - very similar, this buffet appears to shake the cockpit much more than the cabin, yet is presumably excited by the air over the wings as the flow starts to change, rather than by the air over the forward fuselage.
Airbus did effing fly 330 to check buffet levels, both waaay before AF447 and after. 340 test was not part of official accident investigation and only confirmed that 330 and 340 have very similar approach to stall characteristics.