Hi DW,
but if you allow bad data in, you'll get bad data - and feedback - out (GIGO principle).
If someone could please explain how an A330 could ever have a CAS<60kts (at 1 g) whilst airborne - then I'll give up on this point.
If you are feeding "bad data" (intermittent / silent stall warning) onto the flight deck - then you'll probably get bad diagnosis out.
To focus on that disregards the fact that the stall warning had been sounding consistently for around a minute without being acknowledged or acted upon by either of the flight crew present at the time.
Please view
Audio clues tend to get filtered out by the brain during high work load. It is much better to use tactile (vibration / stick shaker).
It also disregards the fact that the Captain was presented with unstable pitch tending towards nose-up, a rapidly unwinding altimeter and unreliable speed indications - would not these factors alone be enough to deduce a stall?
Page 76 Interim report 3:
"In the absence of relevant information from the copilots, reading the information available on the screens (pitch attitude, roll, thrust, vertical speed, altitude, etc…) was not sufficient in itself for the Captain to become rapidly aware of the airplane’s situation. He did not then ask questions that could have helped him to understand the sequence of events.
The stall warning lasted 54 seconds continuously, during which time neither of the copilots made any reference to it. It is likely that the Captain heard this warning a few moments before coming back into the cockpit, but it is also likely that the multiple starts and stops added to the confusion and disturbed his diagnosis of the situation."