Solo:
I think at the moment the UN lacks the credibility that the Red Crescent would bring in Arab eyes, as some see it as a US led talking shop. The humanitarian operation can never be risk free, but there are some questions to which there are no effective answers at this stage:
1. If the UN undertakes humanitarian support before the FMA is secure then who has responsibility for securing it when they have no madate for war-fighting operations? (ergo Bosnia 1993-95)
2. What happens if the UN troops have an agenda that frsutrates the effective prosecution of warfighting aims?
3. If we end up in OBUA, then how will the UN react to extra-ordinary operations when they would have entirely different RoE? and what impact might this have on the coalition forces who would have to defnd them given that the UN will not deploy heavy arty/arm support?
The CSS element will have to evolve in an OBUA envirnment from GSLogSupp to CSLogOp combined with effective and real-time G2 just to support the echelons. If they also had to support de facto UN soldiers operating independantly from the C3I environment then it becomes a nightmare. Also, if the Americans can't keep out Islamic militants from their own forces, how do we ensure the security of coalition forces when there is an unknown and un-controlable (relatively) body of men who may see the US/UK as the enemy operating under the UN banner.
At this stage it would confuse the issue too much. I advocate getting the key objectives won and secured before getting the quasi-governmental UNHCR and Red Crescent in first before the transition to peacekeeping begins. Then let the Arabs reconstruct their own region.