Some interesting stuff here, and I identify with much of what the OP has said. I retired 12 years ago, but the cockpit that was my office for my last 14 years is still regarded as pretty much state-of-the-art. If I understand him/her correctly, an MCP is what the manufacturer of my a/c calls the FCU (the Flight Control Unit for all auto-flight selections, i.e., FD and AP).
I used to be a bit of an anorak on calls, and the standardisation of the particular ones that my fleet had chosen to adopt. They had to be compatible with the aim of cross-fleet standardisation, the other fleets all being Boeing or MD.
Reading the previous twenty-odd posts demonstrates that you are unlikely to find two pilots in a bar that are in agreement on what should be verbalised and what is unnecessary. I guess "noise" is any unnecessary and unproductive sound. To be justified, a call must at the very least be succinct, unambiguous and informative. Even then, a plethora of them can be distractingly counterproductive. But some are so important that they justify their existence as verbalising the cross-monitoring between the two pilots, and confirming understanding. It's a compromise, but whatever standard calls we decide to make must be planned and executed properly, or they are no more than a noise.
Standard calls can probably be categorised into three types: commands, responses, and verification calls. When the PF calls for (commands) "Flaps (x)" it is important that the PNF reads back the command BEFORE making the selection (s)he thinks has been commanded. That's what I mean by a response. If the response is not what the PF wanted, there needs to be time for him/her to prevent the wrong selection being made. If all is well, nothing else needs to be said, because both the pilots and the flight-warning system will monitor that the selected flap has been achieved.
This thread, however, seems to be mainly about what I have described as verification calls. Someone has pointed out that, as far as AFS selections on the MCP/FCU are concerned on a/c of the current generation, it's only the changing FMAs that need to be observed and, if necessary, verified verbally. On these a/c, all indications visible on the MCP/FCU are reflected on the FMAs of each pilot's PFD.
There may still be pilots who, while turning the appropriate knob, observe the changing parameter on the adjacent readout (where present) like they did on B757s. The trouble is that - for example - having carefully selected a new altitude and armed it, turbulence may cause you to fumble the knob as you remove your hand. So it's better to avert your gaze to your FMAs at the beginning, and observe the whole process through to its conclusion there.
This philosophy reads across to the FMA verification call, as follows.
(1) It should NEVER be made by the pilot who performed the selection. If the other pilot fails to make the call, making it yourself is valueless at best. This is not a competition, nor a box-ticking exercise. Wait for your colleague to come back into the loop. If necessary, any prompting should be on the lines of "Check your FMAs?" If his/her workload is too high, best leave it be.
(2) It should only be made AFTER the selecting pilot has removed his/her hand from the relevant MCP/FCU selector.