Originally Posted by Gums
Glad to see a few that "believe" in a decent AoA indication that could have the "limit" AoA clearly marked for the pilot.
What limit?
Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
The pitots don't measure the angle of attack!
What do they measure?
Originally Posted by BOAC
Indeed, 100kts TAS is well enough to register an AoA on a balanced probe
100 kt in which direction?
Originally Posted by RetiredF4
why besides the AoA a speed indication is needed to determin wether you are in a full stall.
Really, why?
Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
Why keep the 60 kt logic when airborne?
Really, why?
Originally Posted by RetiredF4
At the moment we are discussing the inconsistency of the stall warning, right?
What inconsistency?
Originally Posted by retiredF4
Due to an airspeed, which was inconsistent in itself?
And therefore rendered an available AOA indication as unreliable?
What occurrence are you discussing here?
Originally Posted by RetiredF4
And you think, that is a logic system in itself and not worth improving?
Improved in what way?
Originally Posted by BOAC
That sounds suitably over-complicated.
How would you simplify it?
Originally Posted by RetiredF4
I can understand that some input like speeds are necessary to compute the exact angle of attack.
Why is it so?
Originally Posted by RetiredF4
Why not implement a logic, where an AOA value above the highest stall onset AOA bypasses the above logic and thus keeps the stall warning active?
Really, why not?
Originally Posted by BOAC
no - the lack of stall warning when the Captain arrived in the cockpit was non-'trivial'.
What occurrence are you referring to here?
Originally Posted by gums
I do not understand the "HUD resistance" here by several heavy pilots that seem to tolerate MFD's that are crowded with data and tapes and....
What MFDs are crowded with data and tapes? How do you propose to reduce crowding?
Originally Posted by ventus45
We all now know, definitively, that (a) the AoA resolver outputs were available, and (b) that they were valid. Discarding them is unforgivable.
Why every aeronautical power that be does not see that?
Originally Posted by ventus45
The “below 60kias” is a classic case of such an arbitrary false premise “knock out filter”.
How many medium and heavy jets vent below 60 kias while airborne, ever?
Originally Posted by ventus45
That allows the aeroplane to tell a pilot, “Everything else, air-data wise, is tits up guys, but I still have valid AoA, any use to you ?
TWA843
Cheap provocation, eh? Think again, gentlemen. All of these questions are answered many times during the course of 11 threads we had on subject yet same old opinions resurface again and again. Please put some effort in answering these, I would really like to know what you didn't understand last time and time before that and before that...
Originally Posted by gums
I never worried about ":floors" or "protect" or any of that.
You were not supposed to return it to earth unscathed if everything went southward so not much point in having backup FCS modes. No ACES in passenger jets.
Originally Posted by Turbine D
As I understand it, the idea is for the PF to look through the center of the HUD and fly the flight path symbol, but incorporate the side displays in his periphery vision as to how they maybe changing.
Well... might be idea but it doesn't work out this way. I'd estimate the display to be 2 - 2.5 times wider than PFD and display being monochromatic aggravate the complete scan. It excels at visual approaches where any change in flightpath is immediately recognized as conformal flight path vector jumps around and that's the only thing you need to know besides speed. It is excellent for CAT3a approaches where there is not much scan anyway - you just make perfect doughnut with aeroplane symbol and guidance cue, shorten the speed error tape as much as possible, keep energy caret aligned with wing symbol using throttles (all of the symbols are concentrated in the middle of the HUD so you just stare straight ahead) and rely on F/O scanning classic PFD and HGS annunciator panel to shout "GUIDANCE" if things go pear-shaped.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
My suggestion of an initial "knee-jerk" reaction implies, by definition, an absence of rationality. Explanation is not justification.
It's not kneejerkiness I don't agree with, it's idea that pull-up-no-matter-what came initially from attempt to return couple of hundred feet lost on altimeters when speed correction went missing.
Originally Posted by Chriss Scott
So he handflew in the wrong way, but not because he was unable to handfly?
Exactly! He did not understand what happened despite uttering "We have no good display of speeds" so had no idea the best thing to do under the circumstances was...to do nothing. Pull was so consistent that it just couldn't be unintentional. Problem was within cognition.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
He knew that he wanted to maintain altitude but felt it necessary to keep pulling back on the stick to achieve such?
No. He didn't know anything. He wanted to pull-pull-pull for reasons he never verbalized. If he was afraid of overspeed and tried to trade speed for altitude, why going to TOGA? As soon as the AP dropped out, all the thinking on the FD stopped for good.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
All that needed to be done in AF447 was to keep the wings level
Done.
and MAINTAIN a suitable pitch attitude and thrust for high-altitude cruise.
Yes but this is all very well when you either know what happened or maintain presence of mind not to do harm when you are not sure what exactly you should be doing.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
Firstly, you will not learn the very gentleness of any corrections that need to be made on the side-stick if you unexpectedly find yourself without the AP at high altitude.
You suggest that A330 is sensitive beast that has to be treated gently. I say that it is exaggeration and you can throw her around hamfistedly at cruise altitude, in alternate law for 4 minutes with normal acceleration varying between +1.96 and -0.26G with end result being no worse than just utter mess in cabin and galleys.
How are we going to resolve this?
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
Well, I agree that the three main L.O.C. cases we have been discussing the last few months have involved different pilot reactions to problems in the cruise, but all have been seriously deficient:
Why are we not discussing some other LOCs like Birgenair? 20 000 hrs could not prepare the skipper for simple recognition that rejecting the takeoff when airspeed is not working is a must or just to crosscheck the three ASIs. Or close call at EHAM where the guy who taught others how to perform V1 cut just couldn't make it properly when it happened for real? That's what AF447 is about
: the crew that just couldn't perform when it needed to. It's very ugly picture and I understand the need to try to overpaint it with unrealistic theories about FBW or instrumentation.
Originally Posted by vilas
Pilots without jet experience have to undergo ELT MCC as part of Airbus type rating where Absolute raw data flying without ATHR, AP, FD, FPV is taught.It includes executing SIDs,Arrivals,Approach and landings. Out of eight sessions 6 are to be flown manually. So 447 pilots were not strangers to raw data flying.
Depends on what local CAA will allow, operator demand and training organization provide. In my case it was all spiced up by flying in direct law. It was piece of cake but then it was sim, not a real aeroplane over Atlantic at 4AM.
OK I'll give up quoting for a bit but when making sweeping statements about general flying capabilities of modern pilots, bear in mind that more than 30 other crews passed through same ordeal without a scratch and at least four of them were Air France.