Don't let the dogs see it, Chris....................
A quick scan through that report leaves me very puzzled as to who was PF and who was PNF and exactly what were they playing at?
Sadly again absolutely no credit to AF, selection, training and abilities in that incident. I cannot relate to the timeline portrayed in this report.
3 minutes from 'Overspeed' before ANY action is taken - then by PNF?
After 4 minutes the 'Overspeed' ceased and they were practically back at cruise Mach BUT at 6 minutes 'someone' decides to select a slower speed? AND
at 7 minutes extend the speedbrakes when almost at cruise Mach?
At 8 minutes after the 'event' they are still almost 'level' (+200')
Speedbrakes come in after 13 minutes, so I guess they had power against speedbrake for 6 minutes?
Either the world has gone mad or the report has been corrupted in translation. Look what they 'missed'
Nose-up attitude, which had reached 12° pitch up,
ˆ High vertical speed, which had reached 5,700 ft/min,
ˆˆThe flashing frame around the altitude display on the PFD when the altitude
passed 35,200 ft,
ˆˆThe position of the FD cross bars,
ˆˆAltitude until it reached more than 38,000 ft,
ˆˆThe “AP1” display which had disappeared from the FMA strip,
ˆˆThe amber ECAM “AP OFF” message which remained displayed for 9 seconds after the AP disengagement.
The report also says '
Because of the absence of CVR recording, it was not possible to evaluate CRM in order to explain the lack of monitoring of the basic parameters and the flight path.' - Do we really need that?
All this AFTER 447.