DonH throws in some good thought. I'd still like to contest some.
The procedures are set out and well-trained
Well, procedures might be set out, but they do not cover every situation. Therefore to put it right at the beginning of an argument seems to imply this. We need to be careful and vigilant that the same over reliance to automation is not aped with procedures. We definitely need procedures, but as with automation and sops, if there starts to be a religious thirst for all these things to replace basic skills and common sense, then we end up full backstick at FL350.
To pretend that procedures are well trained is somewhat preposterous. We all know how the bean counters cut back on anything they can in training, we all know how the operations bosses limit anything outside hand-cuffing sops, to invalidate such arguments. By simply reading the training syllabus of most airlines, you will discover that it rarely goes one little step beyond the bare minimum set up by regulators under pressure from the managers lobby.
As I've mentioned previously, there are perhaps two, possibly three times when decisive, timely actions are required of the pilot-flying or the captain; they are the rejected takeoff, (captain only - and I do know this is controversial in some circles), stall, TCAS, EGPWS warnings and the go-around. All the other times, including engine failure-fire-damage one can & must take one's time, and by that, (it's been mentioned before), I mean 4, 5 or more seconds, to do nothing but collect one's thoughts and communicate with the PNF calling the failure and calling for the ECAM actions, etc. while taking the radios.
Well put. However todays sops from industry and airlines and especially todays freshmen TRI/Es go the other way. The pandemic of "memory items" and additional "procedures" is creeping up even more after every incident. Just look at some airlines who want UAS to be a memory item, a procedure (see above) that should be well trained (see above) and readily dispatchable by a brain under sudden fire. In sim sessions i regularly, and by that i mean
regularly, see UAS, rapid descents and severe damage assessments and memory items badly screwed up. Why? Because there is way too much emphasis on memory items and wording. When a brain is utterly stressed, it does not perform well. To put it under even more stress with the above is purely and simply counterproductive. I have seen newbees completely blocked because they could not recall the correct name for a checklist or stuttered for seconds to produce the correct pronunciation or term for an item. The TREs were taking notes like wild and elaborated for hours in the debrief of how important it was to know that kind of stuff. Maybe the poor AF-FO was torturing his mind to find the right wording, memory item or "absolutely correct procedure" and by doing that he was blocked-cramped pulling.
Checklist have been introduced to counter such phenomenons and to counter blockage, to give a straw to cling to. I once reverted to the checklist for a emergency descent, becasue i was really surprised in that sim session, just to be marked down for that.
On the other hand there are times where the only thing that is left is your rear side. For a few seconds, after that you have to go back to the marvels of modern aviation, because your bird has become mainly digital.
I contest the statement that todays pilots are still able to do that.
They are NOT well trained enough and NOT free enough from the limiting constraints of over reliance on automation, procedures and sops.
The moment we admit to that we can start working with these wonderful birds A and AB give us.