Hi Dozy, Re, "I'm sure the anecdotal reporting is correct, but at the same time I think it's wrong-headed to try and squeeze this particular incident into a "...Magenta"-shaped mould without any real evidence to back it up. Finding repeatable patterns in a series of mishaps can be something of a double-edged sword, because while spotting and working to eliminate that behaviour will help, it won't help in the case of those incidents where, while outwardly similar in nature, that pattern wasn't involved - and can mask other problems that can be equally as dangerous. "
I too, would use Chris Scott's term, "likely" to describe what happened. This isn't jamming behaviour into the magenta-mold, it is recognizing factors that I, and probably Chris, (don't want to speak for you!), really do know about from having done too many simulator sessions! ;-) where that very phenomenon occurs.
Each sim session's script usually has a few very busy moments where "all hell is breaking loose" with a serious system failure, sometimes combined with a go-around from a low-vis approach.
The single chime and Master Caution are going off constantly, (and one is constantly resetting it), as the ECAM catches up with the FWC messages being displayed and re-prioritized, there may be warnings that the autoflight system has disconnected, perhaps voice-audio warnings, (such as the TCAS warnings) are occurring depending upon the scripted failure(s) - lots of times this usually occurs at/just-after takeoff or, far busier, the go-around, when one is making sure the gear is up, (if no one calls "positive rate", almost invariable the gear is left down while concentrating on other things!), the climb-thrust is set and so on.
The procedures are set out and well-trained as you will know from reading previous threads, but one is working hard, maintaining concentration, anticipating the next step while remembering/executing the drills in sequence. It is a very, very busy airplane when something major goes wrong or one is in cruise and all of a sudden the cautions and warnings come.
As I've mentioned previously, there are perhaps two, possibly three times when decisive, timely actions are required of the pilot-flying or the captain; they are the rejected takeoff, (captain only - and I do know this is controversial in some circles), stall, TCAS, EGPWS warnings and the go-around. All the other times, including engine failure-fire-damage one can & must take one's time, and by that, (it's been mentioned before), I mean 4, 5 or more seconds, to do nothing but collect one's thoughts and communicate with the PNF calling the failure and calling for the ECAM actions, etc. while taking the radios.
To your point, I would be quite certain that the A330/A340 event wasn't a "magenta-line" matter, nor is it startle; I would characterize it as re-grouping & otherwise marshaling one's resources which heretofore had been "at rest" so to speak, and while only partly due to the maintenance of cockpit discipline before launching, is an adjustment of focus while dealing with the inevitable surprise, (none of which is startle - startle is the result of a "comfortable unexpectedness" and perhaps a knowledge-complacency where "relaxed-but-ready" is that which is borne of thorough training, an abiding passion for the books and discussions and a desire to "read" in one's chosen profession which means reading accident reports, studies on current topics as well as staying in the books and knowing one's airplane....going beyond the minimum required to build depth and resourcefullness which can be called upon even once or perhaps twice in one's career and not waiting for, or complaining that one's airline isn't teaching one!
Automation is fabulous and I loved it but if that's all that one knows, one is at risk of being quickly overwhelmed, (startled) by the airplane.