There seems to be the same misunderstanding that only the pilots are to blame for this incident developing as in other threads.
Yes, pilots should be able to fly a visual, non precision or precision approaches. However the recent cargo crash by US pilots at a US field and numerous other accidents and incidents on approach suggest that there are other factors too.
At SFO there are two tightly spaced parallel runways. Switching off the ILS / LOC to either of them is not sensible. This combined with the policy of late runway changes, pairing aircraft on approach and ATC routinely inducing high energy situations increases pilot workload and therefore reduces spare mental capacity and situational awareness.
If the accident aircraft had been on a lazy ten mile final ILS this accident probably wouldn't have happened. The investigating authority has very little influence on the training standards of the airlines that fly to SFO, but a lot of influence on how the ATC and airfield is organised. With a little thought the operating environment could be a lot safer.
I am a regular (every eight weeks or so) visitor to SFO. More often than I'd like I find myself (in a 747) with speedbrakes fully deployed, taking flap near limiting speeds, sometimes gear down way early, using the MCP or hand flying to intercept the visual profile (or if I'm lucky the ILS/LOC) from above with another a/c very close on the parallel approach. How much spare capacity do I and my crew have to deal with an unexpected TCAS RA, an engine failure etc. Contrast that to how much spare capacity I and my crew would have on a lazy ILS with staggered approaches so no other a/c are near.
Don't rely on pilots being skilled to stop them having accidents. It's all about providing the safest possible environment. Do that and you'll have fewer accidents.
remember the age old saying, "a superior pilot uses their superior judgement to avoid using their superior skill"