Originally Posted by
john_tullamarine
I find the smaller digressions we see in threads part of the rich PPRuNe tapestry.
Likewise - I certainly learned something today. In fact I think I'm right in saying that despite being of dubious relevance to the thread subject, we're looking at the first honest-to-goodness new information to be discussed since several threads ago - shame it's tangential!
So, returning - albeit with a somewhat heavy heart - to the subject:
@bubs - I know you were referring, at least in part, to electrical power in your post #614. The tangent occurred because you said in your next post there was no RAT, period, on the 757, which I thought was iffy.
Getting back to that first post, and acknowledging that you seem to have performed some very useful preparation and experimentation for total electrical failure, I ask again - as did vilas and a couple of others - why all this talk of automation, and what relevance does that post of yours have to the subject?
Originally Posted by DW
Airbus aircraft have not had a greater or more complex level of automation than their Boeing or MD counterparts for more than 30 years (almost 40 in fact). Airbus never pushed automation harder than any of their competitors either. The trajectory indicator line on the NAV display isn't even magenta on an Airbus!
Also, given that the AF447 PF was a sailplane pilot, and that there are to the best of my knowledge no, or at least very few, automated sailplanes - it's a bit of a stretch to assume he was across-the-board dependent on automation, do you not agree? Not to mention that to fly sailplanes one has to be able to manage the flightpath by handflying and managing pitch, roll and energy - understanding stall - and particularly how to recover from it - is a prerequisite because gliders don't have TOGA power.
What we don't know is how recently he'd been practicing those skills, but it's fair to assume that he was proficient in them at some point, and remained proficient for some period of time. The recurrent training and practice both the F/Os lacked was of *high-altitude* manual handling only.
The airline industry previously made a dubious move to focus on stall *avoidance* in recurrent training and stopped practicing recovery which, to say the least, didn't help - but the continuing bafflement remains as to how they got themselves into that position in the first place!
I know there's an issue with automation dependence in the industry, and I don't think that anyone posting on this thread seriously supports the notion that increased use of automation is a good idea. What I was trying to understand from you is - why the continued assertions that the F/Os didn't know how to handfly at all and were automation-dependent, when the evidence suggests otherwise, and why you insist that Airbus was the prime mover behind increased use of automation, when the evidence is clear that it wasn't?