CourtneyMill. thank you for your clear answers!!
Assuming you're talking after the war, we would have had no reason to do such a thing anyway. Once the Falklands were liberated, we had no further need for offensive operations.
As for retaliation, I think you may have been fed a line. The UK had absolutely no wish to retaliate whatsoever.
I´m sorry I didn´t make myself clear enough. Yes, I was talkling about the "after war events". I apologize to you all, I misused the word "retaliation"; Freedman´s words refer to "reasonable response to any argentine military adventures".
"Upon reading the November JIC paper which reached this conclusion, the Prime Minister expressed an interest in whether or not offensive operations by Britain might be a reasonable response to any Argentine military adventures: ‘Their shipping and bases are now vulnerable, as we have considerable forces in or near the Falklands’"
L. Freedman. "The Official History of the Falklands Campaign" Volume 2, Chapter 44: "Fortress Falkland". Rutledge. London. 2005. (Quote in page 585)
As for the motivation to fly outside the FIPZ, Freedman states in page 586 that:
"In December 1983 an Argentine submarine deployed much further south than usual, and Heseltine authorised a temporary change in the ROE...A ‘warning zone’30nm in from the edge of the FIPZ was established in which unidentified submarines could be harassed but not attacked unless they unmistakably demonstrated hostile intent. Once a submarine penetrated further than 30nm inside the FIPZ it could then be attacked...This change applied only to submarines but led to Heseltine asking the Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the ROE to ensure that they met the threat from Argentina while minimising the risk of an ‘accidental’ engagement. Out of this came a recommendation that the warning zone concept should be extended to include Argentine surface combatants and combat aircraft, both of which could be unmistakably warned-off by visual means. A warning zone 30nm deep would still leave the Commander British Forces with adequate room and time to engage Argentine combat units that had aggressive intent... The Commander was later given additional discretion to identify potential targets close to, but outside, the FIPZ boundary. This had the added advantage of further extending the range of response to a potential incursion..."
If I´m not clear enough, what I mean to say is that I undoubtly understand that the purpose of the british forces that were either kept or developed to the Malvinas after the argentinean surrender was not to carry on offensive operations against the argentinean mainland. But it´s also true that, since they were to serve defensive popouses only, the best way to acheive just that is to be either ready to strike first (once its known that an offensive action is coming against you) or to have the information and capacities to answer quickly to an "incoming surprise". I believe that both of these options requiere the previous gathering of tactical intelligence.
Since I read the documents released by the UK National Archives in December 2012, and presented in previous pages, I made some connections with Freedman´s statements and came to think that -may be- the UK forces in the island would be needing to gather information/intelligence to be able to properly achive those aims. That´s why I suggest that flights outside the FIPZ were not only a defensive need.
One final note, if I may: as far as I know (and I´m putting a big deal of money and time researching real documents related to this war) most of the "official information" we researchers are able to have access to, comes from the UK. There´s barely a few official documents release and/or published by Argentina on this topic. We basically count on your testimonies, stories, and good will to let us all know about these things that -like me- many find worth asking about.
Hope I´m not a pain in the back to you and thanks again!!
Christian