I find the approach to safety on the NS frustrating.
I don't think that the industry is capable of regulating itself. Too many accountants and not enough real helicopter professionals in management?
1 Bond ETAP ditching - training and operations SOP issue, a sophisticated autopilot which the pilots didn't know how to use properly.
2 Bond L2 - Failure of Maintenance and OEM to intervene in time
3 Bond EC225 MGB - OEM issue but Maintenance and HUMS download should have caught this
4 CHC EC225 MGB - failed to learn the lessons of #3, how obvious can it be?
5 CHC 332L2 - Training and SOP issue? A less sophisticated autopilot not used to its potential?
The OEMs continue to field aircraft and operators and pilots continue to accept some aircraft with known problems (EC225 MGB) covered with a band aid solution. "New shafts" they say but only when your current MGB goes in for overhaul. It could be 3 years before all MGBs are so fitted. Acceptable? ALARP?
How long will it be before the repetitive NDI at 8 hour intervals requiring entry into the MGB and the disconnection of a major control linkage causes another accident? Is such frequent inspection really necessary? If so, should the aircraft type not remain grounded?
The Helicopter industry doesn't want intervention from the regulator (CAA)
The Pilot Unions haven't a clue, and a mooted enquiry by MPs is ridiculed.
The answer is not a self serving closed shop review of the industry by the industry for the industry, an industry in which trust is evaporating.
It's about time that the UK Government ordered a top to bottom enquiry using a group of real safety professionals to show the industry the huge holes in the Swiss Cheese. Its 2 months since 4 people lost their lives, not much to change anything has happened, oh, I forgot about the letters from the CEOs telling everyone they will improve, together!