Originally Posted by IcePack
Sometimes a small excursion outside the safe limits may be required Mother Nature doesn't know the limits. Boeing recognise this airbus doesn't
Would you be so kind to provide reference where small (or big) excursion outside the safe limits saved the day in airliner while it wasn't preceded by severe brainfart (e.g. hung engine leading to high altitude stall in quad) or bizarre failure pushing aeroplane out of envelope? There is abnormal alternate law on FBW Airbi but then it seems not knowing anything about the subject discussed is not considered to be disqulifier when it comes to posting disparaging comments here.
Originally Posted by Uplinker
Yes, but we are not monitoring computers per se, we are monitoring the flight path.
At least, that what aviation authorities believe we are doing. That's why non-backdriven flight and engine controls were certified without objections - their position is demand, while what pilots need to know is result as seen on instruments.
Originally Posted by RexBanner
The A330 stall warner is suppressed below 60 knots because the computers believe the aircraft to be on the ground below that speed.
For 15th time at least: go make AoA vane that will work reliable at 500 and 5 kt. You'll make millions out of it, I guarantee you. Well, at least you'll have a hobby that will last you a lifetime.
Originally Posted by SwissCheese
The Coroner reviewed the full accident report, the relevant medical and pathological evidence, then called the AAIB as expert witnesses to explain the sequence of events and the findings of the BEA report.
Therefore making his opinion legally worthless. Introduction to BEA report refers.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
When the Captain arrived, even he couldn't make head or tail of what was going on until it was too late.
I know what you are referring to but just to make it clear for everyone: there is no indication that anyone in the cockpit ever could make head or tail of anything, even the split second before they were wiped of out existence.
Originally Posted by CapnBloggs
Not "couldn't", "didn't". Poor design.
So say you and when asked to elaborate:
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
I don't need to, Dozy, nor did I ever say there was one. Some bright spark thought that aeroplanes couldn't fly below 60KIAS so decided that they'd turn the stall warning off below that. Bad decision. If the aeroplane's in the air and below stall speed/above stall AoA, keep the stall warning on! Why is that concept so hard for you to grasp?
There is someone around unable to grasp the concept of difficulties of accurately measuring alpha at wildly different q and why it is acceptable to have the instrument that can't measure it where no sane-minded pilot would ever go. It's not DozyWannabe, if you wonder.
Originally Posted by 172510
Is it possible to train a crew so that in case of another failure of the same equipment in the same weather conditions etc. the aircrew would not crash?
Other crews flying the same aeroplane, for the same company, getting the same failure didn't crash or hurt anyone or damaged anything (source: interim2). Now what?
Originally Posted by Flyingmole
Anyone who wants a more informed view on this aspect of it should just (...) listen to David Learmount's very persuasive case. His view is that it is not - as he puts it - a loss of flying skills but a loss of situation awareness and cognition.
Absolutely right, even as this video was out after interim3 got out and before final. Now I don't want to detract from this absolutely superb piece of aeronautical journalism (no irony here) just to add a bit: LOC is the greatest killer nowadays because TAWS has virtually eliminated CFIT and we are currently enjoying the historical low of accident rates and pilots of yesteryear occasionally lost control too.
Originally Posted by jimjim1
As it happened the LHS pilot declined to accept the (very good) advice coming from a less (perhaps inadequately) assertive but far more experienced pilot who's role was Pilot Monitoring. Quite simply I suspect that his (the pilot flying's) head was too big for his boots.
Realistically, matter of command didn't boil down to "Fish or steak for dinner?" but it was rather matter of life and death and neither CM2 or CM1 were able to recognize it because they couldn't recall the most basic aeroplane energy management lessons.
I think that this was the Captains crucial error. (Well apart from leaving the flight deck at all given the proximity of the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone and the associated radar visible thunderstorms, which were a mere 10 minutes ahead).
It was done this way millions times before and hundred of thousand times after without any adverse consequence so what is the problem with it?
Originally Posted by bubbers44
No pilot I have ever met would ever do that because they know how to fly.
If I could travel through time and tell every deceased colleague the way they would meet their eventual demise in aeroplane I am absolutely sure everyone would vehemently deny they would be that stupid to perform it.
Basically, your statements boils down to: "I have no idea about human factors but I'll keep myself opinionated around here".
Originally Posted by PJ2
IIRC, his training for the UAS event was right after takeoff. The memorized pitch attitude is 15° and TOGA for those circumstances
To which I replied that it must be hard for pilot to discern between 400 ft AGL and FL350 over the middle of Atlantic. I don't care about the law or PPRuNers' opinions but I would care a lot if my unfamiliarity with emergency procedures would cost me a life.
Originally Posted by PJ2
in my view is the root cause of the accident because, by following SOPs, (ECAM drills, paper drills, status, etc etc) and using correct CRM procedures to maintain discipline and sort out the problem before independently leaping into (unknown) individual actions, the accident could have been prevented
Actually, not many crews in A330 UAS used procedure, CRM or brains at all. Most of them blankly stared until problem went away by itself. Some ignored stall warning but kept pitch control neutral. Some pulled until stall warning, then pushed, then pulled giving their customers a hell of roller-coaster ride. AF447 crew were only that both pulled and ignored the stall warning. The others lived happily ever after.
Originally Posted by PJ2
Again as I have pointed out numerous times, a UAS event is NOT an emergency and does not require instant, un-coordinated, undisciplined action. It is not an engine fire, a depressurization, an hydraulic failure etc. The airplane itself does not 'care' what the airspeed indication is.
Again, I fully agree just to make it perfectly clear: no emergency requires uncoordinated or undisciplined action, even "instant" in transport aeroplane means 3-5 seconds.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
As I've said before, I also wonder if the APPARENT sudden loss of about 300 ft of altitude (due to the removal of correction for airspeed when the IAS went AWOL) might have provoked a knee-jerk (of the wrist) response.
I only wish it were so - there would be general mushing around new indicated FL350 but not a few thousand feet climb.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
The aircraft was in roll direct. He apparently he had no prior experience in flying in Alt2b Law in the simulator at altitude and likely, no experience in flying in Direct law at altitude. As a result, his mental model of the aircraft response was out of calibration and his control inputs were well beyond appropriate for roll.
No they were not. He put roll under control pretty efficiently and way before stall warning went off third and the longest time.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
It is very likely that Bonin's nose up efforts were initially inadvertent as he struggled with the roll, then later, deliberate as he either reverted to seat of the pants flying or started flying the flight director.
At some points he kept nose well above FD bar, at some points he pulled when there was no FD available.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
The lack of experience in direct law at altitude was a key contributing factor that allowed a roll PIO to develop, and from there, it all snowballed downhill.
There were about forty A330 crews that went through similar predicament. Every single one was inexperienced. Just one perished.
Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
The crew seem to have simply continued to follow those erroneous commands.
True, if we take just what was happening from 2:11:10 and ignore everything that went before. Now, give me a good reason why we would do that.
Originally Posted by Winnerhoffer
In fact, few (if any) PMs anywhere are trained to take over the airplane.
I've never heard of it being practised in the simulator or as part of actual hands-on training exercise.
Duuuude! You are blissfully unaware that everyone in developed world nowadays is trained to take over and was so even way before AF447.
Originally Posted by Winnerhoffer
AF447 conjecture will remain unless the DCVR is released in its entirety but the BEA has instead provided inedible hashed morsels.
Dude, two posts and you are already acting like some veterans around here... wait a sec... did someone got banned recently?
Originally Posted by Winnerhoffer
The juge d'instruction can force the BEA to do it.
Can't.
Originally Posted by Winnerhoffer
Why has she not?
UN, more precisely: ICAO. Now if France would consider leaving ICAO a small price to pay for BEA judicially being forced to release transcript...