Originally Posted by
Mr Optimistic
True but it didn't have to be just then and there are some oddities to the events. At least one of the pilots was anxious for his return and questioned the delay in returning and there is no mention in the released transcript of his reference to being bell'ed back or having just got his head down. Still, no need to upset Dozy
Hi Mr. O. Firstly, feel free to "upset" me all you like - it's not about that and I'd never presume to have such delusions of grandeur. It's just that most if not all of the questions asked in the R&N thread that was merged into this one - and those that have arisen subsequently - have already been covered in the existing threads. I'm sure I'm not the only one who doesn't want to see the hamster-wheel spun up again!
Originally Posted by
rudderrudderrat
Since the crew didn't turn off the FD switches, when the FDs automatically reappeared, they were in modes HDG & VS. The crew seem to have simply continued to follow those erroneous commands.
While your second sentence is informed conjecture (it's a possibility, but only one of many), your first is absolutely correct. Additionally, failure to turn off the FDs - which was, IIRC, part of the UAS procedure - implies to me that the PF was not in fact applying that procedure, as others have suggested.
Originally Posted by
Winnerhofer
[FO Robert's] seat remained fully back and to the left in the parked position the entire time.
Did it? I know Bill Palmer made that claim in his excellent book on the subject, and I know the LHS was apparently in the "storage" position upon impact, but the CVR did record a "noise of seat being adjusted" at 2:03:38 (i.e. after Robert took his seat and the Captain vacated the flight deck). This raises several possibilities, including:
- The noise was from Bonin moving the RHS forward
- The noise was from Robert moving the LHS forward, and he may have returned it to the "storage" position to accommodate the Captain on his return
The second possibility can make sense if one takes into account that the cockpit noise had increased significantly at the onset of stall, and rendered the seat motor noise unintelligible to the Cockpit Area Microphone.
As for the position of the RHS, and its importance to Bonin's leverage on the sidestick, the report is crystal clear on that point.
Originally Posted by BEA AF447 Final Report (English) p.110
The right side seat was positioned 5.5 cm from the most forward position with a right side armrest bearing the indication of A3 adjustment. This adjustment is consistent with the piloting position of a pilot with the morphology of the PF. The pilot (PF) was attached via lap and crotch belts.
My plea to avoid the return of the hamster wheel remains - not just because of the sheer amount of information and questions answered in the previous threads, but also as the existence of the report - which, combined, should provide all the information that can be proven. I know that as pilots, you'll all feel an especially visceral need to answer the questions that cannot be proven - above all why the PF acted as he did. But all we have there is conjecture, and that conjecture has already been minutely examined in the existing threads.