Flight Planning and Operational Control
I must admit to being somewhat bemused by comments appearing on this thread that implies ATS briefing officers arbitrarily "tore up flight plans" or did not accept flight plans in order to protect "their backsides".
I would like to balance this debate by highlighting some facts based on someone who was in the ATS system for many years (up to senior management level) and who also had significant operational experience in the pilot briefing role:
1. No briefing officer (ATC or FS) had the authority to arbitrarily not accept a flight plan from a pilot. They had a responsibility to give the pilot all the critical information for the flight (both forecast and actual) and to provide advice based on their ATS/flying experience where it was considered appropriate. However, provided the flight plan met regulatory requirements, if the pilot still wanted to have the flight plan lodged with the ATS system, then the briefing officer was bound to accept it;
2. The only time a briefing officer was justified in not accepting a flight plan from a pilot was if the flight did not meet regulatory requirements. Typically, these situations included flights intending to operate into remote areas or over water without the proper equipment, flights planning to enter an active restricted area or IFR flights intending to operate contrary to designated one-way air routes or IFR flight plans with altitudes below the published LSALTs. Based on my experience when a flight plan was being rejected by a briefing officer, it was always done in a professional manner, usually followed up with a bit of empathetic education if the pilot was either a student, inexperienced or new to the area;
3. If a briefing officer felt that a pilot (particularly a VFR pilot) was intending to proceed into weather conditions or into an area (remote or over water) that would present a potential safety risk to the aircraft's occupants, the briefing officer had the option of referring the matter to the Senior Operations Controller responsible for the relevant Flight Information Region. I had to exercise this option on a number of occasions in the past. The SOC had the power to either exercise operational control directly over the subject aircraft (even if it was VFR OCTA) or issue a direction to the pilot for the flight not to proceed;
4. Briefing officers were required to retain all flight plans lodged with the relevant briefing office, regardless of whether the flight plans were eventually activated or not; and
5. In all my years of experience, I have never heard of a briefing officer arbitrarily tearing up or rejecting a flight plan.
With respect to other comments as to whether the abolition of operational control has resulted in the loss of life, I would have to say, yes, and point to the PA31 accident at Mt Hotham as a good example. If Operational Control had still been in place at Melbourne, I am sure the SOC would have directed that flight remain on the ground at Essendon. Although no loss of life occurred in the recent VA B737 incident at Mildura or the Pelair accident at Norfolk Island, the lack of effective operational control in my view was a factor in both of these situations.
However, I also agree with comments on this thread that the proper place for operational control should rest with the pilot in command but, in order for safe operational control to be exercised, the pilot in command needs to supported by an effective ground based dissemination system within the pilot's organisation. Unfortunately, I don't consider this to be the case for many of Australia's airlines or larger charter operators, particularly for the smaller regional airlines.