wozzo;
On July 27, 2011 when the 3rd Interim Report came out with the flight data and we saw for the first time what actually occurred, I posited the notion that the PF increased the pitch because that what he was taught in his last (A320) sim session when given this problem. I maintain that the memory drill for UAS is confusing and poorly-written. It has in fact been modified prior to the accident, clarifying how the drill will be done, as has the way it is taught since the accident.
IIRC, his training for the UAS event was right after takeoff. The memorized pitch attitude is 15° and TOGA for those circumstances. Rather than climb on board the another hamster wheel, the original post is
here.
Many disagree with this notion but I have seen no other explanations with greater plausibility and lots of psychological etc explanations which may or may not be true. I believe that he believed he was doing exactly as he was trained, uncertain though the stick inputs were, but did not have the experience to know what was about to happen to the energy of the aircraft. If he had pulled to 5deg as the checklist seems to indicate, (and then when above MSL or circuit altitude, level off for troubleshooting, which is what cruise altitude already is), I think it would have not resulted in the stall. I think he kept pulling because the airplane wasn't at 15° - all in all a series of inputs that speak to uncertainty and hesitation.
As I have pointed out numerous times, likely in all eleventeen threads on this accident, cockpit discipline,
meaning their SOPs and CRM, fell apart instantly and that in my view is the root cause of the accident because, by following SOPs, (ECAM drills, paper drills, status, etc etc) and using correct CRM procedures to maintain discipline and sort out the problem before independently leaping into (unknown) individual actions, the accident could have been prevented because there were a number of points along the pathway to the stall that would have altered the course of this accident had such been employed.
Again as I have pointed out numerous times, a UAS event is NOT an emergency and does not require instant, un-coordinated, undisciplined action. It is not an engine fire, a depressurization, an hydraulic failure etc. The airplane itself does not 'care' what the airspeed indication is.
I am certainly not going to argue the "competent-incompetent" case. I have been in and seen too many things in 35 years of flying tranports and had sufficient personal "lessons" offered by the airplane I was flying to ever place myself in a position of judging. However, the basics of successful transport flying are, (and have never wavered from being) Standard Operating Procedures, and, since late eighties, Crew Resource Management, and these were/are no doubt heavily emphasized at AF as at all other carriers, neither of which this crew carried out when it came time to do so. I am unconvinced of "startle" - everyone is 'startled' to begin with - I have experienced a massive hydraulic failure on the same equipment and yes, it was initially startling but one reverts to training and deals with the ECAM accordingly. I have no idea why it came apart so swiftly and we'll never know. All we can do is re-emphasize what would have saved this airplane, this crew and these passengers, because this was not an emergency and there was no requirment to do anything other than ensure the airplane was stable while the ECAM drill was done according to Airbus SOPs. A pitch-up to 5° would not result in a stall so even if the PF had done the drill correctly, the accident likely would not have occurred. Anything after the airplane was stalled is untravelled territory and nobody can offer advice except that which is already in the books, specifically, if you have a high rate of descent that cannot be arrested by pulling back, you are stalled and need to unload the wing and reduce the angle of attack to unstall the wing, and then be very gentle on the pull-through.
All of this and more from many others exists in the AF447 series of threads. I genuinely hope we are not on another hamster wheel.