I am surprised that this had not yet been posted. I post without comment other than at my age I doubt anything will ever be done to combat the possibility of fatigue being a factor in cockpit decision making. It seems that for every intelligent call for change and better practice, there are 100 trite and shopworn responses such as: "If you do not like it quit." "In 40 years of flying I was never tired and in my day a 30 hour duty day was the short day." "All these moaners are just pilots that do not rest on layovers." "You are a professional (somehow this title obviates the humanity of the person) and therefore should either tuck it in or stop the operation."
Pretty enlightened approach to warding off accidents it it not?
------------------------
UPS Crash Raises Pilot-Rest, Training Concerns
Voice-Recorder Captures Crew Discussing Fatigue Prior to August Accident
By
Andy Pasztor
Oct. 10, 2013 8:02 p.m. ET
The captain of a United Parcel Service Inc. cargo plane that crashed in August took an unusually long time getting promoted to captain and had complained he was fatigued before the fatal accident, according to people familiar with details of the probe.
Preliminary findings from the Birmingham, Ala., crash, which haven't been reported before, are expected to spark debate about the relative safety of cargo carriers versus passenger airlines. The last fatal crash of a U.S. passenger plane occurred almost five years ago, while six cargo pilots have died since then in three separate accidents involving scheduled U.S. jet freighters.
The National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of the Airbus A300 accident also is likely to prompt renewed attention to differences in federal oversight, including supervision of pilot-training programs and a FAA decision in 2011 exempting freighters from stringent new pilot-rest requirements slated to kick in at the end of this year.
The 58-year-old UPS captain, Cerea Beal , had more than 6,000 hours flying experience with UPS, about one-quarter of it as captain on the widebody A300. A former Marine Corps helicopter pilot who started working for the carrier in 1990, he had remained a co-pilot for about 19 years, an unusually long time, which people familiar with his training record attributed to difficulties during some simulator sessions.
He was promoted to captain four years ago, and a UPS spokesman said there is "no record of him failing" a test to be upgraded to captain. "He was fully qualified, held appropriate FAA operating and medical certificates, and was legal to fly," UPS said.
The cockpit-voice recorder on UPS Flight 1354, the people familiar with the probe said, captured Capt. Beal and his 37-year-old first officer, Shanda Fanning , discussing how tired they were—and how fatiguing they felt UPS overnight schedules could be—before their predawn approach to Birmingham.
The UPS spokesman said "we strongly object to any assertions that UPS crew scheduling was not compliant with FAA rules or was a factor in this accident."
With all of the plane's systems apparently working properly and Capt. Beal at the controls, the A300 arriving from Louisville slammed into a hill less than a mile short of the runway, killing both pilots. The NTSB hasn't officially determined the cause, but investigators previously said they uncovered no problems with engines or other onboard systems.
The crash raises broader issues related to what many safety experts describe as excessive reliance on automation by many jetliner pilots. The safety board, which is expected to hold a public hearing on the crash next year, has indicated it wants to determine whether UPS training and cockpit procedures may have contributed to complacency by the crew.
In August, safety board member Robert Sumwalt said investigators planned to examine UPS instructions to pilots about how to fly such approaches and "look to see if there are wider systemic issues that need to be addressed."
An NTSB spokeswoman wasn't available for comment.
The jet's autopilot and automated speed-control system were turned on and programmed to provide a steady descent during the non-precision approach. The runway wasn't equipped with a full-blown instrument landing system capable of bringing a plane in on a specific path, or glide slope, and the crew failed to recognize the plane's trajectory was taking it short of the strip, according to the NTSB.
The autopilot remained on until the last few seconds before the jet clipped a power line, hit some trees and erupted in a fireball. Safety experts said such non-precision approaches can be tricky, particularly at night when it may hard to spot terrain around the airport.
With the airport's system of landing lights illuminated to help the pilots stay on the correct descent path, "they should have had lots of visual warnings that the plane was way too low," according to Bill Waldock , a professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. "There was plenty of time to see" the problem and adjust the flight path, he added.
Investigators have said they want to determine if fatigue may have impeded cockpit reactions. The flight into Birmingham was the end of the second day of a four-day trip for the crew. The pilots were scheduled to report for duty at around 10 p.m. for a nearly nine-hour work period.
Safety experts have said such overnight hours, often referred to as backside-of-the-clock flying, pose particularly serious fatigue hazards. One issue is whether pilots are able to get adequate sleep when their rest periods are scheduled during the day.
The FAA's new pilot-rest regulations, among other things, require passenger carriers to adjust crew schedules to reflect the rigors of overnight flying, and mandate setting up formal fatigue-risk management systems. In announcing the tougher rules at the end of 2011, FAA officials unsuccessfully urged cargo operators to voluntarily adopt the same scheduling limits as passenger carriers.
Seconds before the Birmingham accident, according to investigators, the pilots received an automated alert from an onboard collision-avoidance system, warning them the plane was sinking dangerously quickly.
On Thursday, UPS said it trains pilots "how to manage automation and provides opportunities and training to demonstrate proficiency in a non-automated environment." The carrier declined to discuss whether it has changed training procedures.
Write to Andy Pasztor at
[email protected]