From Dennis Kenyon.
Sirs,
I'm happy to see some very qualified engineers taking part in this discussion. But can I reduce the matter to simple terms. The constant quoting of various AD's SB's etc, is all very well, but the bones of my taking issue with the CAA is simple.
One accident is happenstance, a second may be a coincidence, but when a third occurs something is going wrong.
My contention is that following the third accident a more responsible and aware authority, (be it FAA or CAA or uncle tom cobley) should have accepted the fact that the flow of AD's, SB's being released etc, while being a proper course of action - WERE SIMPLY NOT WORKING.
In such circumstances the obvious fix was to mandate the fitting of the re-designed (dash 3) clevis cluster. Had the FAA/CAA done this, my son and others would not have lost their lives.
Then when the AAIB formally recommended the mandating of the
later component, it is totally and absolutely unacceptable for the FAA/CAA to refuse. So an eighth accident occurs and another pilot loses his life.
Do I now have to formally advise the CAA that if another fatal occurs, I WILL RAISE a manslaughter charge against the individual responsible for the CAA's decision. Perhaps that might concentrates someone's mind.
Paul Kenward made a mistake relying on memory and the weld work in front of him. Negligent yes, but had the regulatory authorities acted properly when the problem became apparent, he would not have found himself in that invideous position. It is significant that the AAIB found six 'causal factors' for the accident, one directed to the engineer, and two to the CAA.
Also note that of the nine accidents I have tracked down, only one, (G-ZAPS) was the subject of a weld repair. One might even argue, (although not backed up by the metallurgist) that Kenward's weld repair actually prolonged the cluster life which was on its way to a failure anyway.
Please continue the contributions which I am following avidly.
Dennis Kenyon.