Originally Posted by flarepilot
I hope this thread ends with this post.
Well, I was hopeful that we could … but … I kept reading further …
Originally Posted by flarepilot
Some people knew the plane's rudder would cause this to happen if ''reversed'', some didn't know. The real question and problem is why didn't the line pilots know? (and don't say they should have known, that's just a dopey excuse, like you should have known if you married ethel her cooking would give you gas)
I agree with you that the question you pose is proper and should be answered. If one were to look at the regulations with respect to what has to go into a training program, you should find that among other things is the necessity to include the Airplane Flight Manual in that education. Now, the issue would become, what MUST the manufacturer place into that AFM? If it included information about flight controls, and the airplane was susceptible to losing some/all of the tail structure with rapid rudder inputs/reversals, it should be clearly noted. Perhaps someone should demand that the regulator (all the regulators, actually) take another look at this requirement and how it is fulfilled.
Originally Posted by flarepilot
Doing my bit of research, the US government was quite concerned over the role many interested parties had in trying (repeat, trying) to influence the outcome of the NTSB probable cause. Were there attempts to influence? Yes. Did they influence the final report...you decide.
Any time there is an accident that has considerable consequences there are always persons who make some level of attempt to influence, or ask premature questions as suggestions, or drop other such subtle hints … and I have “first-hand” knowledge of such occurrences. (more on this privately, if you'd like)
Originally Posted by flarepilot
The FAA has in the past known about problems with certain planes in certain conditions and have not passed the information along to the users of the planes. I can remember especially the problem with the F28 Fokker and so called ''hard wing planes''. An accident in Canada showed the problem and it was repeated three years later in the US...oops, the FAA forgot to tell the users.
If this is factual and if the FAA had such knowledge and did not provide it to the appropriate interested persons after verifying its accuracy … I would support a public riot in front of 800 Independence Avenue in Washington.
Originally Posted by flarepilot
There has been more than enough hatred on this thread as to ruin the bond we share in the sky. Claims and counter claims of experience and the like. One recent one about departure stalls in a transport category airplane sim really got to me. We did departure stalls in our douglas, mimicking a takeoff without proper flaps/slats, akin to the tragedy in Detroit many years ago...we called them departure stalls. We also did stalls in the approach/landing configuration and called them approach to landing stalls. We also did stalls in the clean configuration.
Don't attempt to pontificate on what airlines own wording is about unless you have flown for all airlines or approved their training programs.
This is probably the section that garnered the most of my interest for responding … you say you did “departure stalls” and “approach to landing stalls” and you mentioned accomplishing “clean configuration stalls” as well and because of the discussions, I am presuming you mean that you did these stalls in the Airplane Flight Simulator. I am curious – were these simulators of the older or newer versions – and for timing era reference … the older simulators I’m describing were “Pre-1980,” the newer versions are Mid-1980s, and the most modern were built after about 2005.
The specific question has to do with motion and visual system installations and, specifically, the flight data and engine data packages that were incorporated. My guess is that what you did in the simulator was likely “recovery from approaches to stall” as opposed to “recovery from an aerodynamic stall” as this was the requirement when done in the airplane – and there was no requirement to do more in the simulator than was done in the airplane … and, there wasn’t much objection because everyone understood, rather completely, that the recovery from an aerodynamic stall in a simulator could not be simulated with any degree of accuracy. So, as recovery from an approach to stall in the simulator would be only slightly different from recovering from an approach to stall in an airplane, authorizing this in a simulator seemed to be acceptable. The minor problem was that the simulator handling and performance conclusions were based on somewhat limited aerodynamic information gained from flight testing and programmed into the simulator computer. The major problem was that the response of the turbine/jet engines were not tested at approach to stall angles of attack nor for stall angles of attack, and it is suspicioned that data for the differences that would make either do not exist, or exist in only limited cases for limited applications. Therefore, these data are not incorporated into the simulator's computers. This came to light quite significantly in the analysis of the Airborne Express DC-8 accident, in Narrows, Va.
It has only been within the past 18 months that an effort, led by the FAA’s Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Flight Simulation, in coordination with the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Royal Aeronautical Society, using the Boeing Company, Bihrle Applied Research Inc., and CAE Electonics, Ltd., has a reasonable aerodynamic model been drafted, produced, and minimally researched as being minimally effective in full stall maneuvers in the most advanced simulator available in today’s market. This model has not been finalized nor released for system wide application.
Originally Posted by flarepilot
The FAA better make darn sure everyone knows more about their planes and that training and examination proves everyone knows.
From your lips to God’s ear.
Originally Posted by flarepilot
NOw, quit talking about this please
Well …?