Originally Posted by flarepilot
the transports I fly DO have placards for gear extension speeds and flap speeds. don't yours
and speeds for failure of rudder limiter to engage and for rudder limiter to disengage are all right there.
methinks you protect airbus too much.
and yes I've flown a transport cat plane that did have a placard for the following: do not use more than half control wheel throw above FL400
It’s a shame that you read incorrectly when you interpret my comments here as being a “fan” or a “protector” of Airbus. I’m not particularly “for” or “against,” that particular manufacturer, despite your acusations.
Originally Posted by flarepilot
wake up to reality
a plane crashed, pilot blamed
but enough other pilots have spoken up on this forum and in other places to make everyone wonder.
SHEESH
I am quite sure you have not read many, if any, of my previous posts here, and have not had the opportunity to accurately interpret any of what I might offer here. So … let me assure you that I don’t like laying the blame for an accident at the feet of any pilot – unless that is the correct place. In fact, with regard to this specific accident, I seem to recall my previous posts (some 6-8 years ago, or more) saying that the F/O most assuredly was at the controls when this particular accident occurred. It was this F/O who made the control inputs that resulted in the tail separating from the airplane – it wasn’t because of poor workmanship or substandard materials or construction. BUT, after having said all that, I also said that this F/O most assuredly had lots of help in getting to the accident site. I also said that this particular flight encountered 2 wingtip vortices, not just 1. This F/O transitioned the first encounter quite professionally and with very little use of the rudder, if any at all. My question originally (and it remains a question in my mind today) had to do with why the precise, subdued, professional, and very successful transition with the 1st encounter … and the result of the 2nd vortex encounter being the overly severe control applications in all three axes, but most significantly in lateral and directional control responses – and the fact that those responses went to the control limit a good share of the time and consisted of substantially, and very quickly, reversing those inputs. Did he remember his training the 1st time (which was successful) and forget it the 2nd time (which was unsuccessful)? Or, did he forget his training the 1st time, and after recognizing that what he did was successful - i.e., the airplane maintained the desired flight path – then with the 2nd encounter, decided to do something way beyond what he had just witnessed and experienced as being successful and decided to maximize his control inputs? We may never know. But I think it appropriate for all of us to carefully analyze what happened, including what the results were with both of the "corrective actions" taken … and ensure that this information is widely disseminated and incorporated into all airline pilot training programs.
Did the AAMT course once offered by AA have anything to do with the magnitude of response used in this second encounter? I don’t know. And I don’t think anyone can say for sure. I know that the AAMT course did discuss the use of the rudder – but as I recall my exposure to that particular course (and no, I wasn’t employed by AA), was that the use of the rudder would be appropriate to assist in bringing the nose back to the horizon if using down-elevator was inappropriate or ineffectual after reaching an unacceptably high pitch attitude. Once achieving an angle of bank, pressuring the bottom rudder would bring the nose back to the desired attitude with respect to the horizon. I am also aware that AA did modify the content of this course to be sure that they weren’t encouraging an inordinate use of the rudder – and, I understand, eventually dropped the course altogether. However, if this course did contribute to the accident, it would leave open the question as to why the substantial use of rudder seen prior to the separation of the vertical tail did not occur during the first wingtip vortex encounter?
I hope this clarifies my comments for you.